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Abstract
Part I of this Article discusses historical precedent for the use of military commissions. Part II
discusses President Bush’s Military Order of November 13, 2001 (“Executive Order”) [FN14] as
well as various procedural rules issued for the military commission trials. [FN15] Part III discusses
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which struck down those arrangements.
Part IV discusses the recent revisions to trial procedures made in the Military Commissions Act,
and also analyzes the extent to which these recent revisions: (a) diverge from trial procedures un-
der the Uniform Code of Military Justice; (b) alter U.S. domestic implementation of the Geneva
Conventions; (c) *783 deprive U.S. courts of habeas corpus review regarding Guantanamo de-
tainees, seek to deprive U.S. courts of review over other issues of international law, and attempt
to create new immunities regarding certain war crimes; and (d) render military commission trials
profoundly overbroad—exceeding all historical precedent—for example, by authorizing trials of
individuals obtained far from any field of battle and/or without any link to armed conflict. This Ar-
ticle concludes that the Military Commissions Act is politically and legally unwise, and should be
thoroughly revised so that trial procedures adhere to prior courts-martial procedures under the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice and to the Geneva Conventions. The concluding section argues that
in attempting to change how the United States implements the Geneva Conventions, Congress is
setting hugely problematic precedent–virtually inviting other countries to unilaterally change how
they implement the Geneva Conventions when it behooves them. The denial of habeas corpus
review is also profoundly troubling given suggestions that detainees could be held at Guantanamo
indefinitely. Finally, the concluding section suggests that there is confusion as to the proper use
of military commissions derived from invocations of a global “war on terrorism” or “war on ter-
ror”; as to individuals apprehended far from any field of battle and/or not during traditional armed
conflict, trials should be held in federal court, pursuant to federal anti-terrorism laws, as were
terrorism cases in the United States throughout the 1990s.
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"We must never forget that the record on which we judge these
defendants is the record on which history will judge us to-
morrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it
to our lips as well."1
INTRODUCTION
After terrorist attacks by members of al-Qaida against the
United States on September 11, 2001, and after the United
States' military response in Afghanistan against al-Qaida and the
Taliban regime that had harbored al-Qaida, President George
W. Bush authorized the creation of military tribunals to be held
at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba ("Guanta-
namo") .2 The tribunals were given jurisdiction to try: (i) mem-
bers of al-Qaida, (ii) individuals "engaged in" or who "aided or
abetted, or conspired to commit acts of international terrorism
... ," and (iii) those who "knowing harbored" individuals cov-
* Ms. Trahan has served as Counsel and Of Counsel to the International Justice
Program of Human Rights Watch. She is a Lecturer at Columbia University's Masters in
Human Rights Program, and an Adjunct Professor at New York University's Masters in
Global Affairs Program, Fordham Law School, Brooklyn Law School, and The New
School. She is the author, inter alia, of GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY- A DIGEST OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Human Rights Watch ed., 2006). The thoughtful comments
of Miles Fischer, Mark R. Shulman, and Katherine Newell Bierman on earlier drafts of
this Article are very much appreciated. Deepinder Mayell, Nicole Washienko, Alexan-
dra Scuro, and Jill Dawson provided research assistance for this Article. The views ex-
pressed herein are those of the author and not Human Rights Watch.
1. Justice Robert H. Jackson, Opening Statement before the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg (Nov. 21, 1945), reprinted in TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF
THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 167, 168 (Jonathan Segal ed., 1992).
2. The United States holds an indefinite lease on the Guantanamo Bay naval base,
and has "complete jurisdiction and control over" the area. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466, 471 (2004). The military commission tribunals could, however, sit elsewhere than
Guantanamo. See RULES FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS (R.M.C.) 201 (a) (3), printed in THE
MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://www.defense-
link.mil/news/d20070118MCM.pdf.
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ered by categories (i) or (ii).3
In its decision, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, issued on June 29, 2006,
the U.S. Supreme Court held President Bush's military order
creating the military commissions defective.4 In particular, the
Court found the military commissions invalid because they did
not follow the procedures required for U.S. courts-martial trials
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("Uniform Code of
Military Justice" or "UCMJ")5 and violated the Geneva Conven-
tions.6 In response to the Supreme Court's ruling, Congress en-
acted and President Bush signed the Military Commissions Act
of 2006 ("Military Commissions Act") to govern future military
commission trials at Guantanamo.7 This legislation does not
conform trial procedures to those of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice and the requirements of the Geneva Conventions,
but rather changes UCMJ procedures vis-d-vis Guantanamo trials
and U.S. implementation of the Geneva Conventions. It also
eliminates habeas corpus review regarding all Guantanamo de-
tainees,' prohibits certain judicial review of issues of interna-
tional law, and creates immunity regarding certain war crimes
resulting from collateral damage.9
As a result, future military commission trials could suffer
from serious flaws, including potentially violating the Geneva
3. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trials of Cer-
tain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism § 2(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 16,
2001) [hereinafter Executive Order].
4. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
5. The Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"), codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-
946, controls proceedings before the U.S. courts-martial.
6. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. These treaties will be
referred to collectively as the "Geneva Conventions."
7. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified
in various sections of U.S.C.) [hereinafter Military Commissions Act].
8. Congress had already eliminated habeas corpus review for future Guantanamo
cases in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005).
The Detainee Treatment Act was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Hamdan to not
cover pending cases. See infra Part III.A.
9. See infra Part IV (discussing Military Commissions Act).
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Conventions Common Article 3 standard requiring that trials be
conducted by a "regularly constituted court affording all the ju-
dicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civi-
lized peoples."' 0 The stakes are indeed high, because if that is
the case, then the United States, in proceeding with military
commission trials, could arguably be committing war crimes.1"
Similarly, if the United States tries any members of the Taliban
(the former regular armed forces of Afghanistan), who should
be treated as prisoners-of-war (i.e., lawful enemy combatants) us-
ing the standards established under the Military Commissions
Act, that might arguably constitute a "grave breach" of the Ge-
neva Conventions, also a war crime.1 2 Furthermore, by altering
its implementation of the Geneva Conventions, the United
States risks continuing to tarnish its reputation as a country that
is willing to abide by the rule of law and the laws of war. 13
Part I of this Article discusses historical precedent for the
use of military commissions. Part II discusses President Bush's
Military Order of November 13, 2001 ("Executive Order") 4 as
well as various procedural rules issued for the military commis-
sion trials. 5 Part III discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which struck down those arrange-
ments. Part IV discusses the recent revisions to trial procedures
made in the Military Commissions Act, and also analyzes the ex-
tent to which these recent revisions: (a) diverge from trial pro-
cedures under the Uniform Code of Military Justice; (b) alter
U.S. domestic implementation of the Geneva Conventions; (c)
10. Geneva Conventions, supra note 6, art. 3 [hereinafter Common Article 3].
Common Article 3 is found in all four iterations of the Geneva Conventions.
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c) (2006) (including "grave breaches" of Geneva Conven-
tions and "Common Article 3" violations among war crimes). While Congress has at-
tempted to create certain immunities in this regard, as discussed infta, it can only
change how the United States implements war crimes laws but cannot change war
crimes laws of other countries, so at least some potential exposure remains.
12. See id.
13. Serious harm has also been done to the reputation of the U.S. military through
the Abu Ghraib scandal in Iraq, as well as persistent attempts by the U.S. Government
to authorize questionable interrogation techniques. See, e.g., HINA SHAsI, HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST, COMMAND'S RESPONSIBILITY. DETAINEE DEATHS IN U.S. CUSTODY IN IRAQ
AND AFGHANISTAN (2006), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06221-etn-
hrf-dic-rep-web.pdf.
14. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. at 57833.
15. See Procedures for Trials by Military Commission of Certain Non-United States
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 32 C.F.R. § 9.1-9.8 (2002) [hereinafter Military
Commission Order No. 1].
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deprive U.S. courts of habeas corpus review regarding Guanta-
namo detainees, seek to deprive U.S. courts of review over other
issues of international law, and attempt to create new immunities
regarding certain war crimes; and (d) render military commis-
sion trials profoundly overbroad-exceeding all historical pre-
cedent-for example, by authorizing trials of individuals ob-
tained far from any field of battle and/or without any link to
armed conflict.
This Article concludes that the Military Commissions Act is
politically and legally unwise, and should be thoroughly revised
so that trial procedures adhere to prior courts-martial proce-
dures under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and to the Ge-
neva Conventions. The concluding section argues that in at-
tempting to change how the United States implements the Ge-
neva Conventions, Congress is setting hugely problematic
precedent-virtually inviting other countries to unilaterally
change how they implement the Geneva Conventions when it
behooves them. The denial of habeas corpus review is also pro-
foundly troubling given suggestions that detainees could be held
at Guantanamo indefinitely. Finally, the concluding section sug-
gests that there is confusion as to the proper use of military com-
missions derived from invocations of a global "war on terrorism"
or "war on terror"; as to individuals apprehended far from any
field of battle and/or not during traditional armed conflict, tri-
als should be held in federal court, pursuant to federal anti-ter-
rorism laws, as were terrorism cases in the United States
throughout the 1990s.
I. HISTORICAL USES OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS
A. Authority for Military Commissions
Authority to create military commissions derives both from
the U.S. Constitution ("Constitution") and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice.16 Presidential powers regarding military com-
missions reside in Article II of the Constitution, which makes the
President "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy." 17 Con-
16. See Am. BAR ASS'N TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & L., REP. & RECOMMENDATIONS
ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS 2 (2002) [hereinafter ABA REPORT]; see also Hamdan v. Rum-
sfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773-74 (2006).
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 1; see also Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773 (invoking the
same).
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gress holds the power to "declare War... and make Rules con-
cerning Captures on Land and Water," to "raise and support Ar-
mies," to "define and punish . .. [o]ffenses against the Law of
Nations" and "[t]o make rules for the government and regula-
tion of the land and naval forces.' 8 The Supreme Court ex-
plained in Ex parte Milligan that "[t] he power to make the neces-
sary laws [regarding military commissions] is in Congress; the
power to execute in the President."19
While the Court in Ex parte Milligan suggested that the Presi-
dent might act without Congress to create military commissions
where "controlling necessity" is present,20 Congress has since
been interpreted as having generally authorized the creation of
military commissions. Specifically, Article 21 of the UCMJ pro-
vides:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon
courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost
courts or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction
with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the
law of war may be tried by military commission, provost court,
or other military tribunals.
21
The predecessor provision, Article of War 15, adopted in 1916,
contained substantially the same language.22 These provisions
have been construed as retaining prior common lawjurisdiction
over military commissions. 23 While the Supreme Court in its re-
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 10, 11, 12, 14; see also Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773-74
(citing Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 347 n.9 (1952) and quoting WILLIAM WIN-
THROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 831 (2d ed. 1920)) (invoking the Constitution).
19. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2, 139-40 (1866).
20. The Supreme Court stated:
[T] he President... [cannot] without the sanction of Congress, institute tribu-
nals for the trial and punishment of offences, either of soldiers or civilians
unless in cases of a controlling necessity, which justifies what it compels, or at
least insures acts of indemnity from the justice of the legislature
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) at 139-40 (quoted in Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773-74). The
Supreme Court, in the recent Hamdan decision, did not answer whether Milligan prop-
erly articulated this standard, in view of Congress having subsequently authorized the
creation of military commissions through the Articles of War and, later, the UCMJ. See
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774.
21. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2006).
22. See ABA REPORT, supra note 16, at 2. Article of War 15, when originally enacted
in 1916, did not contain the language "by statute or" before the words "by the law of
war." See id. In 1920, when Article of War 15 was renewed, that language was added. See
Madsen, 343 U.S. at 350 n.17.
23. See ABA REPORT, supra note 16, at 2 n.8 (explaining that both Article 21 and its
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cent decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld suggested that the charac-
terization of Article of War 15 (and thus Article 21 of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice) as "congressional authorization
for military commissions" was "controversial," it did not revisit
the issue.24
B. Past Use of Military Commissions
Historically, there have been three types of military commis-
sion:25 (i) commissions that substitute for civilian courts at times
and places where martial law has been declared ("martial law
tribunals") ;26 (ii) commissions to try civilians "as part of a tempo-
rary military government over occupied enemy territory or terri-
tory regained from an enemy where civilian government cannot
and does not function" ("occupied territory tribunals") ;2' and
(iii) commissions "incident to the conduct of war" when there is
a need "to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those ene-
mies who .. .have violated the law of war '28 ("law-of-war tribu-
nals"). It is the third type (or some variant of it) that is at issue
here. Military commissions are used because "the jurisdiction of
the court-martial proper, in our law, is restricted by statute al-
most exclusively to members of the military force and to certain
specific offenses defined in a written code."2 9
A precursor to the military commission was used for trying
British Major John Andr6 for spying during the Revolutionary
predecessor, Article of War 15, were intended to retain the common lawjurisdiction of
military commissions); see also Madsen, 343 U.S. at 350 (in the Articles of War, Congress
"expressly preserved to 'military commissions, provost courts or other military tribunals'
all of their existing concurrent jurisdiction").
24. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 ("We have no occasion to revisit Quirin's contro-
versial characterization of Article of War 15 as congressional authorization for military
commissions.").
25. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775 (citing Bradley & Goldsmith, Congressional Au-
thorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2047, 2132-33 (2005); WINTHROP,
supra note 18, at 831-46; Hearings on H.R. 2498 before the Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 975 (1949)).
26. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775; see also Robinson 0. Everett & Scott L. Silliman,
Forums for Punishing Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 29 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 509, 514-
16 (1994) (surveying history of war courts as created in the past by the United States).
27. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775-76, (quoting Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S.
304, 314 (1946)); see also Everett & Silliman, supra note 26, at 514-16.
28. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2776 (quoting Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1942)).
29. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 347 n.9 (1952) (quoting WINTHROP, supra
note 18, at 831.
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War."° The military commission "as such" was inaugurated in
1847 during the Mexican War.A Military commissions first had
extensive use during the Civil War, when terrorist saboteurs
from the opposing army were frequently sentenced capitally by
military commissions for seizure, arson or destruction of trans-
portation, communication or other systems of infrastructure.12
Civil War tribunals operated both as martial law tribunals and
law-of-war tribunals, trying both ordinary crimes and war
crimes. 3
Law-of-war military commissions were used in the context of
World War II, and their use occasioned three Supreme Court
rulings. In Ex parte Quifin,34 the Court upheld the use of a mili-
tary commission sitting in Washington D.C. that tried eight sabo-
teurs, originally from Germany, who landed on the Atlantic
Coast by submarine, armed with explosives.36 The Court upheld
the use of the military commission created by order of the Presi-
dent, explaining: "By the Articles of War, and especially Article
15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitution-
ally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try of-
fenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases. 3 7
30. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773 (citing WINTHROP, supra note 18, at 831). What
was essentially a military commission trial was ordered by George Washington for trying
Major John Andre, Adjutant-General to the British Army, for spying, and in particular,
meeting with U.S General Benedict Arnold. See id.
31. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773 (quoting WINTHROP, supra note 18, at 832). While
military commissions tried "ordinary crimes" committed in occupied territory, it was a
"council of war" that tried offenses against the law of war; however, that dual system was
later not adopted and a single tribunal took jurisdiction over ordinary crimes, war
crimes and breaches of military orders. Id.
32. See SpencerJ. Crona & Neal A. Richardson, Justice for War Criminals of Invisible
Armies: A New Legal and Military Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA. CIx U. L. REv. 349, 368
(1996). Use of military tribunals occurred after President Abraham Lincoln suspended
the writ of habeas corpus and authorized martial law in several regions. See CRS RE-
PORT, Louis FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS: HISTORICAL PATrERNS AND LESSONS 16 (Cong.
Res. Ser., 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32458.pdf [herein-
after CRS REPORT]. For further discussion of the use of military tribunals during the
civil war, see id. at 16.
33. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2776 n.27 (citing John M. Bickers, Military Commis-
sions are Constitutionally Sound: A Response to Professors Katyal and Tribe, 34 TEX. TECH. L.
REv. 899, 908 (2003)).
34. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
35. One saboteur had been a citizen of the United States, although, upon attain-
ing majority, he apparently either elected to maintain German citizenship and/or re-
nounced his American citizenship. See id. at 20.
36. See Everett & Silliman, supra note 26, at 513-14 n.26.
37. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28. The military commission at issue there was created
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Because the petitioners had buried their German military
uniforms on the beach after landing, they were tried as "unlaw-
ful belligerents.""
In Johnson v. Eisentrager,39 the Supreme Court, in the context
of review of a denial by a district court of petitions for habeas
corpus, held that twenty-one German nationals incarcerated in
the Landsberg Prison in occupied Germany could be convicted
by a military commission sitting in China for violations of the
laws of war.4 ° The Supreme Court held that "enemy aliens" who
have not been within the United States' territorial jurisdiction
have no constitutional right to habeas corpus review, while ob-
serving that military tribunals have been held to be lawful for
trying law of war violations.4
The Court additionally upheld jurisdiction for a military
commission to try Japanese General Tomyuki Yamashita, former
Japanese commander in the Philippines, for war crimes, in In re
by the President. See id. at 22-23; see also id. at 26 (the "Articles [of War] also recognize
the 'military commission' appointed by military command as an appropriate tribunal
for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of war not ordinarily tried by
court martial").
38. While they carried their arms openly, they failed to wear a "fixed distinctive
emblem" otherwise required to qualify as lawful belligerents. See Third Geneva Conven-
tion supra note 6, art. 4.A(2) (requiring a command structure, uniforms with a "fixed
distinctive sign," that arms be carried openly and that operations be conducted in ac-
cordance with the laws and customs of war). The Court held: "It is without significance
that petitioners were not alleged to have borne conventional weapons or that their
proposed hostile acts did not necessarily contemplate collision with the Armed Forces
of the United States." Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37. The remainder of the decision is devoted
to the issue of whether it was constitutional to try the defendants without a jury. The
Court held that it was. See id. at 38; see also Everett & Silliman, supra note 26, at 513-14
n.26 (discussing facts of Quiin).
39. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
40. Id. at 766. The tribunal was constituted by U.S. Commanding General at
Nanking, by delegation from the U.S. Commanding General, China Theatre, pursuant
to authorization granted by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. See id.
41. See id. at 777-80, 787. Specifically, in finding that enemy aliens have no consti-
tutional right to habeas corpus review, the six critical facts the Supreme Court focused
on were that the prisoner:
(a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United States; (c)
was captured outside of our territory and there held in military custody as a
prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting
outside the United States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed
outside the United States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned outside the United
States.
Id. at 777. In Rasul v. Bush, the Court however suggested it would be possible to distin-
guish these facts from those concerning at least certain of the Guantanamo detainees.
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 476 (2004).
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Yamashita.4 2 Yamashita had argued that the military commis-
sion, which had been created by order of Lieutenant General
Wilhelm D. Styer, lacked jurisdiction to try him after the cessa-
tion of hostilities.4" The Court upheld the power to try enemy
combatants by military commission even after hostilities had
ceased, at least until peace was officially recognized by treaty or
proclamation.44 (In both In re Yamashita and Ex parte Quirin, the
Supreme Court engaged in a full review of the merits of the
habeas corpus petitions presented, while ultimately denying
leave to file the petitions).45
Additional military commissions were also employed by the
United States after World War II for trials in the U.S.-occupied
portion of West Germany.46 These commissions have been de-
scribed as similar in composition and procedure to the interna-
tional war crimes tribunals following World War 11 4 7"-the Inter-
42. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
43. See id. at 9-10. Styer was Commanding General of the U.S. Armed Forces in the
Western Pacific. He acted under orders from General MacArthur, Commander of the
U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific, who, in turn, acted under orders from the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the President. See id. at 10.
44. See id. at 12. A subsequent case, Madsen v. Kinsella, recognized the propriety of
using military commissions "even after peace has been declared, pending complete es-
tablishment of civil government in an occupied territory." Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S.
341, 348 n.12 (1952). The Yamashita decision has since been widely criticized for im-
posing a concept of command responsibility beyond what was then recognized in the
law: that Yamashita was responsible for the crimes of his troops because "they must
have been known" to Yamashita, and if he did not know "it was simply because he took
affirmative action not to know." RICHARD L. LAEL, THE YAMASHITA PRECEDENT: WAR
CRIMES AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 83 (1982) (quoting Transcript of Record at 100;
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1). For criticism of the case, see Ann Marie Prevost, Race and War
Crimes: The 1945 War Crimes Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 14 HUM. RTs. Q. 303,
328-29 (1992); see also CRS REPORT, supra note 32, at CRS-16.
45. For instance:
While it is the usual procedure on an application for a writ of habeas corpus in
the federal courts for the court to issue the writ and on the return to hear and
dispose of the case, it may without issuing the writ consider and determine
whether the facts alleged by the petition, if proved, would warrant discharge of
the prisoner.
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 24 (citing Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 284; Yamashita,
327 U.S. 1).
46. See Everett & Silliman, supra note 26, at 514-15. Two hundred and fifty-eight
lesser officials of the Third Reich were sentenced to death by such American military
tribunals. See Crona & Richardson, supra note 32, at 388-89; see also Madsen, 343 U.S.
341 (upholding military commission trial of military spouse for murdering her husband
while he was stationed in U.S.- occupied Germany following World War II, where civil-
ian courts were not functioning).
47. See ABA REPORT, supra note 16, at 5.
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national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg48 and the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East.49
Past uses of military commissions, however, have not been
without their share of controversy. First, it has perennially been
a source of conflict whether presidential or congressional au-
thorization is required for military commissions.5" Thus, for ex-
ample, the dissent in Madsen v. Kinsalla argued that Congress
should have created the military commission at issue (an occu-
pied territory tribunal), which was used to try a U.S. citizen
charged with murdering her husband in the U.S. Area of Con-
trol in occupied Germany. The dissent argued that "no part of
the Constitution contains a provision specifically authorizing the
President to create courts to try American citizens."5 Second,
the Eisentrager case holds that "enemy aliens"-at least in certain
48. The International Military Tribunal ("IMT") at Nuremberg, Germany was cre-
ated by the four Allied Powers, and onlyjudges from those powers heard the cases. The
IMT at Nuremberg tried a total of twenty-two defendants, of whom nineteen were con-
victed and twelve condemned to death. For background on the Nuremberg trials, see
generally MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL 1945-46: A Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY (1997).
49. The IMT for the Far East was created by Special Proclamation of General Mac-
Arthur. See Elizabeth S. Kopelman, Ideology and International Law: The Dissent of the In-
dian Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 23 NYUJ. INT'L L & POL. 373, 388 (1991). The
judges were from eleven different countries. See Dr. R. John Pritchard, The International
Military Tribunal for the Far East and Its Contemporary Resonances, 149 MIL. L. REv. 25, 27
(1995). The IMT for the Far East tried a total of twenty-eight defendants, of whom
seven were sentenced to death by hanging, and eighteen to prison terms; two died
during trial and one was found mentally incompetent. See Maria Hsia Chang & Robert
P. Baker, Victor's Justice & Japan's Amnesia: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Reconsidered, in
THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE: JAPANESE WAR CRIMES 33, 37-38 (Peter Li ed., 2003).
At least one scholar prior to the Supreme Court's Hamdan decision argued that the
Yamashita case provides poor precedent because under the then-governing Geneva
Convention of 1929, prisoners of war, including Yamashita, could be convicted and
sentenced "only by the same courts according to the same procedures as in the case of
persons belonging to the forces of the detaining Power"-i.e., courts martial; yet,
Yamashita was tried by military commission. See George P. Fletcher, War and the Constitu-
tion, AMER. PROSPECT, Jan. 14, 2002, at 26.
50. As Colonel William Winthrop explains:
In some instances . . . Congress has specifically recognized the military com-
mission as the proper war-court, and in terms provided for the trial thereby of
certain offences. In general, however, it has left it the President, and the mili-
tary commanders representing him, to employ the commission, as occasion
may require, for the investigation and punishment of violations of the laws of
war and other offences not cognizable by court-martial.
Madsen, 343 U.S. at 347 n.9 (quoting WINTHROP, supra note 18, at 831).
51. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 372.
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circumstances-may be denied habeas corpus review,52 a posi-
tion also adopted by Congress in the recent Military Commis-
sions Act-yet, highly problematic in the current context.
Finally, past uses of military commissions occurred either
where the United States was either clearly engaged in a conven-
tional war, or following such a war. U.S. engagement in Afghani-
stan, particularly against Taliban armed forces (and even al-
Qaida) resembled such a conventional war, and, indeed, fol-
lowed congressional authorization for the use of force.54 Yet,
there are added aspects of the "war against terrorism" that are
dissimilar to a conventional war-particularly where detained in-
dividuals were apprehended far from any field of battle. Are
these individuals part of a "war"? Or should they be treated
more akin, for example, to how drug traffickers would be
treated-subject to federal law and prosecuted in federal court?
If this is a legitimate "war," who is the enemy? When did such a
war commence-on September 11, 2001, or prior thereto? And
when will such a war cease-or will it continue indefinitely, al-
lowing the United States to apprehend suspected terrorists
worldwide indefinitely? 55
C. Procedures for Past Military Commission Trials
Authorities seem in some disagreement as to how they char-
acterize the procedures that have been used in the past for mili-
tary commission trials-although this divergence may simply be
a matter of gilding the lily differently. Some have suggested that
52. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950).
53. See infra Part W.C.
54. Congress authorized the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or har-
bored such organizations or persons." Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L.
No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). Similarly, the U.N. Security Council recognized the
United States' right to self-defense. See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12,
2001). The Supreme Court and Congress have also recognized that a state of war may
exist without formal declaration. See ABA REPORT, supra note 16, at 5 (citing The Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800)); see also WINTHROP, supra note
18, at 668 (regarding the Mexican War, Congress did not "declare war"; rather, it recog-
nized that "by the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between that
government and the United States").
55. For example, the Yamashita case suggests that military commissions can try en-
emy combatants after hostilities have ceased until peace is reached. See In re Yamashita,
327 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1946). It is unclear how this standard would apply to an open-ended
"war" against terrorism. For further discussion of such issues, see infra Part IV.D.
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military tribunals "have been relatively free in adopting whatever
procedures they like, even adopting them after a trial is under-
way."56 Supporters of this position cite, for example, Ex parte
Quiin and Yamashita, where the "Presidents and military com-
manders devised rules and procedures that departed widely
from . . . earlier statutory standards. 57
The Supreme Court, by contrast, in its recent Hamdan deci-
sion explains that "the procedures governing trials by military
commission historically have been the same as those governing
courts-martial."58 The Supreme Court notes that accounts of
"authoritative" commentators "confirm as much."5 9  The Su-
preme Court, however, admits that there has been "a glaring his-
torical exception to this general rule," namely, the Yamashita
case, in which the procedures "deviated in significant respects
from those then governing courts-martial."6" The Court notes
that two members of the Yamashita Court offered an "unusually
long and vociferous critique" regarding the departures from the
"procedures and rules of evidence" used in courts-martial tri-
als.61 Among the dissenters' primary concerns was that the com-
mission could consider all evidence "which in the commission's
56. CRS REPORT, supra note 32, at 35.
57. Id. For example, President Roosevelt's order that created the military tribunal
at issue in Quirin directed that the trial record, including any judgment or sentence, be
transmitted "directly to me for my action thereon." Id. at 38. This conflicted with Arti-
cles of War 46 and 50 1/2 that provided that conviction or sentence by a military court
was subject to review within the military system. Id. at 38-39. In a memorandum, Justice
Frankfurter offered the view that he had "not a shadow of doubt" that Roosevelt "did
not comply with Article [of War] 46 et seq." Id. at 42 (citing "Memorandum of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, In re Saboteur Cases," Papers of William 0. Douglas, Box 77, Library
of Congress).
58. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2788 (2006) (citing 1 THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 248
(2d ser. 1894)).
59. Id. at 2788 (citing WINTHROP, supra note 18, at 835 n.81, 841-42; S. REP. No. 64-
1, at 40 (1916) (testimony of Gen. Crowder); H. COPPEE, FIELD MANUAL OF COURTS-
MARTIAL 104 (1863)).
60. Id. at 2789 (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1). In Johnson v. Eisentrager, there was a
claim that the individuals were entitled to be tried:
[B]y the same courts and according to the same procedure a in the case of
persons belonging to the armed forces of the detaining power," but the Court
held that "no prejudicial disparity is pointed out as between the commission
that tried prisoners and those that would try an offending soldier of the Amer-
ican forces of like rank.
339 U.S. 763, 790 (1950).
61. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2789 (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 41-81 (Rutledge, J.,
joined by Murphy, J., dissenting)).
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opinion 'would be of assistance in proving or disproving the
charge,' without any of the usual modes of authentication. "62
The Yamashita majority did not pass on the merits of Yamashita's
challenge to the military commission procedures.63
Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that:
(a) The procedures, including modes of proof, in cases
before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commissions,
and other military tribunals may be prescribed by the Presi-
dent by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable,
apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States
district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsis-
tent with this chapter.
(b) All rules and regulations made under this article shall be uni-
form insofar as practicable and shall be reported to Congress.64
The Preamble to the Manual for Courts Martial additionally
states that:
Military commissions and provost courts for the trial of cases
within their respective jurisdictions. Subject to any applicable
rule of international law or to any regulations prescribed by
the President or by other competent authority, military com-
missions and provost courts shall be guided by the appropriate princi-
ples of law and rules of procedures and evidence prescribed for courts-
martial.
65
Regardless of whether one accepts the characterization that (a)
past military commission trials "have been relatively free in
adopting whatever procedures they like" or the position that (b)
with the exception of Yamashita, military commission trials gen-
erally follow the rule of courts-martial, the starting point for con-
struing the President's original Military Order is in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, Article 36. As discussed infra, the Su-
preme Court in Hamdan reads Article 36 to allow the President
62. Id. (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 49 (Rutledge,J.,joined by Murphy, J., dissent-
ing)).
63. Id. (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 20). The Yamashita Court found Yamashita
neither subject to the Articles of War, nor a "protected prisoner of war." Id. (citing
Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 21). However, subsequently, the UCMJ expanded its category of
persons subject thereto and the Third Geneva Convention extended prisoner-of-war
protections to individuals tried for crimes committed before their capture. See id.
64. 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006) (emphasis added).
65. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, pmbl. § 2(b) (2) (2000 ed.) (em-
phasis added).
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to promulgate rules for military commissions, but that they may
not be "contrary to or inconsistent with" the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and the rules must be "uniform insofar as practi-
cable, " " meaning that "any departure must be tailored to the
exigency that necessitates it. '"67
II. THE MILITARY ORDER AND PROCEDURAL RULES
ORIGINALLY ISSUED
A. The Executive Order Calling for Military Commissions
On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an Executive
Order,' based on his authority, inter alia, as Commander in
Chief,6 9 providing that "individuals subject to this order" shall be
tried by military commission for "violations of the laws of war"
and "other applicable laws."7" Section 2 (A) of the Executive Or-
der defined "individuals subject to this order" broadly as non-
citizens with respect to whom the President determines "from
time to time in writing" that:
66. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790 (quoting UCMJ art. 36).
67. Id. at 2790.
68. See Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. at 57833.
69. Specifically, the Executive Order stated that it was promulgated pursuant to
the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including the Authorization
for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution (Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224), and Sec-
tions 821 and 836 of Title 10 of the United States Code. See Military Order of November
13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. at 57833.
10 U.S.C. § 821 provides that:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do
not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of
concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or
by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or
other military tribunals.
10 U.S.C. § 836 provides, in relevant part, that:
Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases
arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military commissions and
other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, may be pre-
scribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers prac-
ticable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recog-
nized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts, but
which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter.
70. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. at 57833, §§ 1 (E), 2; see also
Procedures for Trials by Military Commission of Certain Non-United States Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism, Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1,
§ 3(B) (Mar. 21, 2002), 41 I.L.M. 725 (codified at 32 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-9.12) (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.defenselink..nil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf (military commis-
sions may try "violations of the laws of war and all other offenses triable by military
commission") [hereinafter Rules].
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(1) There is reason to believe that such individual, at the rel-
evant times,
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al
Qaeda;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to
commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in prepa-
ration therefore, that have caused, threaten to cause, or
have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on
the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign
policy, or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals de-
scribed in subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2 (a) (1)
of this order; and
(2) it is in the interest of the United States that such individ-
ual be subject to this order.71
Thus, the Executive Order broadly covered non-citizen: (a)
al-Qaida members, (b) persons who have engaged in interna-
tional terrorism against the U.S., and (c) persons who harbor
either (a) or (b). The Executive Order also gave the President
flexibility in determining whether persons would be subject to
the Executive Order because it permitted the President to desig-
nate individuals "from time to time in writing" who would be
"subject to this order" where in "the interest of the United
States.
'72
B. Rules for the Military Commission Trials
While the Executive Order was silent on many details of
how the military commissions would function, federal rules
("Rules") were subsequently promulgated to address those de-
tails.7' They provided that the commissions would consist of
three to seven commissioned officers of the U.S. armed forces,
who are appointed to serve on the commissions by the Secretary
of Defense or his designee.74 Convictions and sentencing would
71. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. at 57833, § 2(A). The
Rules additionally provided for jurisdiction over persons "alleged to have committed an
offense in a charge that has been referred to the Commission by the Secretary of De-
fense or his designee." See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.3(A)(2). This language presumably did
not expand the jurisdiction of the commissions since "[in] the event of any inconsis-
tency between the President's Military Order and [the Rules] ... the provisions of the
President's Military Order shall govern." See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.7(B).
72. See Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. at 57833, § 2(A).
73. See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.
74. See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.4(A)(1)-(3). Under the newly promulgated rules, see
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be based on the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of a
military commission, 75 although death sentences would require
unanimity of all seven members of a commission.76 The accused
would have a right to a military lawyer 77 and to select a different
78military lawyer, or to retain a civilian lawyer at his or her own
expense.79
While proceedings would generally be open to the public,
the Presiding Officer8" could close them for a number of rea-
sons, including protecting classified or classifiable information;
"information protected by law or rules from unauthorized disclo-
sure"; the physical safety of participants, including witnesses; in-
telligence and law enforcement sources, methods, or activities;
"other national security interests";8 1 or "for any other reason
necessary for the conduct of a full and fair trial." 2 A decision to
infra note 93 and accompanying text, for a non-capital case, at least five members and a
military judge are required; for a capital case, at least twelve members and a military
judge are required, although that may be reduced to nine members where twelve mem-
bers are not reasonably available because of physical conditions or military exigencies.
See R.M.C. 501 (a) (1)-(3).
75. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. at 57833, § 4(C)(6)-(7);
Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(F). The new Rules also provide for convictions by a two-thirds
vote. See R.M.C. 921 (c) (2).
76. See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(F). Under the new rules, capital convictions would
require a 2/3 vote, but only a unanimous vote by a panel of at least twelve members
would establish the prerequisite for a capital sentence proceeding. See R.M.C.
921(c) (2), Rule Discussion.
77. See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.4(C) (2). The new rules provide: "The accused has the
right to be represented before a military commission by civilian counsel if provided at
no expense to the Government, and by the detailed defense counsel. The accused is
not entitled to be represented by more than one military counsel." R.M.C. 506(a).
78. See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.4(C) (3) (a).
79. See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.4(C) (3) (b). To represent a defendant, the civilian de-
fense lawyer would need to be: (i) a U.S. citizen; (ii) admitted to practice; (iii) not the
subject of sanctions or a disciplinary action; (iv) eligible for access to information "clas-
sified at the level SECRET"; and (v) willing to sign a written agreement to comply with all
applicable regulations or instructions for counsel. Representation by a civilian defense
counsel would not relieve military defense counsel. There would additionally be a
Chief Defense Counsel who would be a judge advocate of the U.S. armed forces, and
who would supervise the overall defense efforts, "preclude conflicts of interest" and
"facilitate proper representation of all [a]ccused." See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.4(C) (1),
(3) (b).
80. The "Presiding Officer" would be a commission member who is designated by
the Secretary of Defense or his designee; the Presiding Officer would be a judge advo-
cate in the U.S. armed forces. See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.4(A) (4).
81. See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(B) (3). For the new rule on the president of the
military commission, see R.M.C. 502(b).
82. See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.4(A) (5) (a). The new rule regarding closure of pro-
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close proceedings could include a decision to exclude the ac-
cused and any civilian defense counsel.
8 3
The Rules provided for the admission of evidence that
"would have probative value to a reasonable person," 4 the pre-
sumption of innocence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 5
Various provisions also governed witness protection and meth-
ods for allowing protected witnesses to testify.86 Certain materi-
als also could be classified as "protected information,"8 v in which
case they would not be disclosed to the accused or any civilian
defense counsel, but could be admitted into evidence if
presented to military defense counsel.8 8
The Rules as originally issued provided for no independent
appellate review by a court.8 9 Congress, however, subsequently,
in the Detainee Treatment Act, provided for appellate review
before the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Columbia for
some final decisions,9" as well as for the creation of "Status Re-
ceedings permits closure only for the purpose of (A) "protecting information the dis-
closure of which could reasonably be expected to damage national security, including
intelligence or law enforcement sources, methods, or activities; or (B) ensuring the
physical safety of individuals." See R.M.C. 806.
83. See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(B) (3). In those instances, military defense counsel,
who would remain assigned to represent the accused even if replaced by civilian de-
fense counsel, could not be excluded. See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.4(C) (3) (b). The new
rules do not appear to permit exclusion of the accused or civilian defense counsel while
trial continues.
84. Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(D) (1). The new rules state: "All evidence having proba-
tive value to a reasonable person is admissible, except as otherwise provided by these
rules, this Manual, or any Act of Congress applicable to trials by military commission."
MILITARY COMMISSION RULES OF EVIDENCE ("MIL.R.EvID.") 402, printed in MILITARY COM-
MISSIONS MANUAL (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
d20070118MCM.pdf. Probative evidence, however, may be excluded on grounds of un-
fair prejudice, confusion, undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumu-
lative evidence. See MIL.R.EVID. 403.
85. See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.5(B)-(C). The new rule requiring proof beyond rea-
sonably doubt is Rule 918(b). See R.M.C. 918(b); see also R.M.C. 920(e) (5) (a) (requiring
instructions as to the presumption of innocence).
86. See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(D) (2) (d).
87. Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(D) (5) (a).
88. See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(D) (5) (b) (the Presiding Officer could order "dele-
tion of specified items of Protected Information" before the documents are made avail-
able to the accused, military or civilian defense counsel; "substitution of a portion or
summary of the information for such Protected Information"; or "the substitution of a
statement of the relevant facts that the Protected Information would tend to prove").
For the current rules on the exclusion of classified information and substitutions for
such information, see MIL.R.EvID. 505, see also infra note 169.
89. See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(H) (4).
90. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005),
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view Tribunals" to review the status of detainees being held.9
As discussed below, both President Bush's Executive Or-
der92 as well as the Rules originally issued93 regarding military
commission trials, have since been replaced.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING IN
HAMDEN V. RUMSFELD
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 4 the Supreme Court struck the mili-
tary commission created by President Bush's November 2001 Ex-
ecutive Order. The Court found that commission procedures
violated (i) the fair trial standards required by the Uniform
Code of Military Justice,95 and (ii) Common Article 3 of the Ge-
neva Conventions.96 Four of the five justices also found that the
charges did not allege a violation of the laws of war.9 7 The Court
also expressed some concerns about why a military commission
would be appropriate in that case, and discussed four precondi-
tions to the exercise of military commission jurisdiction.98
The petitioner in Hamdan is a Yemeni national, held in cus-
tody of the United States in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.99 He was
captured by militia forces in November 2001, during hostilities
between the United States and the Taliban, and was turned
§ 1005(e) (3) (providing that the District of Columbia Circuit shall have exclusive juris-
diction to determine the validity of final merits decisions, with review as of right for
sentences of ten years or more, and discretionary review in other cases) [hereinafter
Detainee Treatment Act]. The new rules on appeals are set forth in R.M.C. Rule 908.
91. Detainee Treatment Act, § 1005(a) (requiring the Secretary of Defense to sub-
mit procedures for status review of detainees). The Military Commissions Act addition-
ally provides that the Secretary of Defense shall establish a Court of Military Commis-
sion Review. See Military Commissions Act, § 950 (f). For further discussion of the Court
of Military Commission Review, see R.M.C. 1201, et seq.
92. See infra Part IV.
93. On January 18, 2007, the Secretary of Defense transmitted to Congress "The
Manual for Military Commissions," setting forth new rules for the conduct of military
commission trials. The Manual consists of four parts: (1) the Preamble, (2) the Rules
for Military Commissions ("R.M.C."); (3) the Military Commission Rules of Evidence
("MIL.R.EvIn."); and (4) the Crimes and Elements. As discussed further below, the new
rules and rules of evidence contain various provisions that are problematic to ensuring
fair trials. See, e.g., infra notes 167, 169, 171.
94. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
95. See id. at 2792.
96. See id. at 2793.
97. See id. at 2800.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 2759.
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over 00 to the U.S. military, which transported him to Guanta-
namo Bay in June 2002.'0 He was charged with one count of
conspiracy "to commit . . . offenses triable by military commis-
sion. 102 He filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus and manda-
mus." 3 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
granted Hamdan's writ of habeas corpus, 10 4 but the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia reversed. 10 5
100. The fact that there was a cash rewards program whereby, inter alia, Afghan
and Pakistani individuals could turn in al-Qaida or Taliban members in exchange for
cash rewards, presents some concerns about the soundness of apprehension methods,
and raises questions as to whether the most appropriate individuals were apprehended
and detained. See generally, MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, REPORT ON GUANTA-
NAMO DETAINEES: A PROFILE OF 517 DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE DATA 17, 19 (2006), available at http://law.shu.edu/aaafinal.pdf (suggesting,
for example, that the United States has used facts such as flight from attacking North-
ern Alliance forces, being a cook for the Taliban, and possession of a Kalashnikov
rifle-something not uncommon in Afghanistan and Pakistan-as grounds for deten-
tion). Based on estimates derived from Combatant Status Review Board letters pre-
pared and released by the U.S. Government, only seven percent of the detainees were
apprehended by U.S. or coalition forces, while thirty-six percent were apprehended by
Pakistani authorities or in Pakistan, and eleven percent were apprehended by Northern
Alliance forces of Afghan authorities. See DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX, supra, at 14; see also
Guantanamo Inmates Say They Were "Sold": Warlords, Others "Trumped Up Charges"for U.S.
Cash Rewards, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 31, 2005, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.
com/id/8049868/ (May 31, 2005) (bounties ranged from $3,000 to $25,000); U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, REWARDS FOR JUSTICE PROGRAM, available at http://www.state.gov/m/
ds/terrorism/c8651.htm (describing reward program).
101. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759.
102. See id. at 2759 (quoting App. To Petition For Certiorari 65a). For further
discussion of the charges, see infra Part III.B.
103. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759. The habeas and mandamus petitions were
originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, but
subsequently transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. See id.
at 2761. A Combatant Status Review Tribunal meanwhile also determined that
Hamdan's continued detention was warranted because he was an "enemy combatant."
Id. An "enemy combatant" is defined under President Bush's Military Order as "an
individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al-Qaida forces, or associated forces
that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners." Id. at
2761 n.1.
104. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004). The District Court
concluded that the President's authority to establish military commissions extends only
to "'offenders or offenses triable by military [commission] under the law of war'"; that
Hamdan is entitled to full protections of the Third Geneva Convention until adjudged
not to be a prisoner of war; and that, whether or not he is classified as a prisoner of war,
the military commission violated both the UCMJ and Common Article 3 of the Third
Geneva Convention, because it could convict based on evidence the accused would
never see or hear. See id. at 158-72; see also Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 at 2761-62 (explain-
ing same).
105. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Court of Appeals, by
contrast, deemed the Geneva Conventions not "judicially enforceable," and held that
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A. Congress Did Not Eliminate Habeas Corpus
Review for Pending Cases
Initially, the Supreme Court examined whether, by passage
of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,106 Congress had elimi-
nated habeas corpus review regarding pending cases. That Act
provides, inter alia, that "no court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider.., an application for a writ of
habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the
Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.""°7 The
Court, however, concluded that because other provisions of the
Detainee Treatment Act were made explicitly applicable to
pending cases, the fact that that language was not made applica-
ble to pending cases was significant.'0 8 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that Congress did not intend to preclude habeas corpus
review of pending cases, and the Act was not an impediment to
the Court's review. 0 9 The Supreme Court did not examine
whether it would be permissible for Congress to preclude habeas
corpus review for all Guantanamo detainees-as it has now done
in the Military Commissions Act. t" °
B. Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction and Whether a
Law of War Violation Was Charged
Congress next examined whether four preconditions to the
exercises of jurisdiction for a law-of-war military commission
were satisfied. First, the Court observed that a military commis-
sion can legally assume jurisdiction only over offenses commit-
Hamdan's trial would violate neither the UCMJ nor the U.S. Armed Forces regulations
intended to implement the Geneva Conventions. Id. at 42-43; see also Hamdan, 126 S.
Ct. at 2762 (explaining same).
106. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005).
107. Detainee Treatment Act, §1005(e), §1005(e)(1). The Detainee Treatment
Act also, inter alia: (i) provides uniform standards for interrogation (§ 1002); (ii) pro-
hibits cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (§ 1003); and purports
to create a defense to prosecutions that the individual interrogating "did not know that
the practices [in use] were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and understanding
would not know the practices were unlawful," specifying that "[g]ood faith reliance on
advice of counsel" is an "important factor ... to consider" (§ 1004).
108. Specifically, the Court found that certain provisions of the Detainee Treat-
ment Act (§§ 1005(e)(2)-(3)) explicitly applied to pending claims. The Court rea-
soned that Congress could have, but did not provide that the section addressing habeas
review applied to pending claims. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2766.
109. See id. at 2762-69.
110. See infta Part IV.C.
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ted within "the theatre of war." Second, the offense "must have
been committed within the period of war." Third, a military
commission may only try members of the "enemy's army" and
"members of one's own army, who become chargeable with
crimes or offenses not cognizable, or triable by the criminal
courts or under the Articles of war." Fourth, a law-of-war com-
mission may only try two offenses: violations of the laws and us-
ages of war, and breaches of military orders or regulations for
which offenders are not legally triable by court-martial under the
Articles of war."'
Hamdan was charged' 1 2 with "'from on or about February
1996 to on or about November 24, 2001,"' "'willfully and know-
ingly join[ing] an enterprise of persons who shared a common
criminal purpose and conspired and agreed with [named mem-
bers of al-Qaida] to commit the following offenses triable by mil-
itary commission: attacking civilians; attacking civilian objects;
murder by an unprivileged belligerent; and terrorism."'1 1 3 Spe-
cifically, he was charged with four "'overt acts' ":
(1) acting as Osama bin Laden's "'bodyguard and personal
driver"' "'believing" all the while that bin Laden "'and his
associate were involved in"' terrorist acts prior to and includ-
ing the attacks of September 11, 2001;
(2) arranging for transportation of and actually transporting,
weapons used by al Qaida members and by bin Laden's body-
guards (Hamdan among them);
(3) driving or accompanying "'Osama bin Laden to various al
Qaida-sponsored training camps, press conferences, or lec-
tures,"' at which bin Laden encouraged attacks against Amer-
ican; and
(4) receiving weapons training at al Qaida-sponsored
camps.' 1
4
The Supreme Court found that the offenses charged were
111. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2777 (quoting and citing WINTHROP, supra note 18,
at 836-39). Winthrop had a fifth criterion-that "the trial must be had within the thea-
tre of war." Id. at 2777 n.29 (citing WINTHROP, supra note 18, at 836). The Court de-
scribed the fifth criterion as a "not-always-complied-with ... criterion." Id.
112. The Supreme Court notes that it took a year after President Bush announced
that Hamdan and five other Guanatanamo Bay detainees were subject to the Executive
Order and trial by military commission before any charges were made against Hamdan.
See id. at 2760.
113. Id. at 2761 (quoting Application to Petition for Certiorari 65a).
114. Id.
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neither committed in a "theatre of war" nor during the relevant
conflict.1 5 As to the conspiracy charges, which extended from
1996 to November 2001, the Court observed that "[a]ll but two
months of that more than 5-year-long period preceded the at-
tacks of September 11, 2001, and the enactment of the AUMF
[Authorization of the Use of Military Force]."116 Similarly, the
Court noted that no purported agreement to commit war
crimes, nor a single covert act "is alleged to have occurred in a
theater [sic] of war or on any specified date after September 11,
2001. "117
Four of the justices concluded that the offense with which
Hamdan had been charged did not state a law of war viola-
tion."" The Court found that "conspiracy" was not a crime ap-
pearing in either the Geneva or Hague Conventions."1 9 It also
noted that while the International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
berg recognized conspiracy to commit aggressive war, it did not
recognize conspiracy to commit war crimes as a violation.
1 20
While the Court noted that the charges also included 'joint
criminal enterprise," it concluded that that is a theory of liability,
not a substantive offense.1 2 ' Accordingly, in the most questiona-
ble part of the decision, 1 22 the Court found that because "con-
115. See id. at 2778-79.
116. Id. at 2777-78.
117. Id. at 2778.
118. See id. at 2759-60 (quoting UCMJ art. 21, 10 U.S.C. § 821).
119. See id. at 2780-81.
120. See id. at 2784.
121. See id. at 2785 n.40.
122. "Joint criminal enterprise" responsibility has been extensively recognized in
the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
("ICTY") and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See generally JENNIFER
TRAHAN, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY- A DIGEST OF THE CASE
LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YuGoSLAVIA 390-438
(2006); JENNIFER TRAHAN & ADELA MALL, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST
HuMANITr. DIGESTS OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 65
(2004).
Furthermore, the crimes with which Hamdan was charged were characterized as
"'attacking civilians; attacking civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent
and terrorism.'" Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761 (quoting App. to Pet. For Cert. 65a). At
least the first two of these are recognized violations of the laws of war. See, e.g., TRAHAN,
supra, at 122-35 (discussing elements of the crime of unlawful attack on civilians and
civilian objects under ICTY law); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Cham-
ber Judgment, 223 (Jan. 31, 2005) ("The offence of attack on civilian objects is a
breach of a rule of international humanitarian law [derived from Article 52 of Addi-
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spiracy to violate the law of war" is not itself a violation of the law
of war, "the charge does not support the commission's jurisdic-
tion"; thus, "the commission lacks authority to try Hamdan."
123
The Court appropriately also noted the lack of urgency in
trying Hamdan that was suggested by the facts:
Any urgent need for imposition or execution of judgment is
utterly belied by the record; Hamdan was arrested in Novem-
ber 2001 and he was not charged until mid-2004. These sim-
ply are not the circumstances in which, by any stretch of the
historical evidence or this Court's precedents, a military com-
mission established by Executive Order under the authority
of Article 21 of the UCMJ may lawfully try a person and sub-
ject him to punishment. 124
C. The Commission Violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice
The U.S. Supreme Court further concluded that the mili-
tary commission convened "lacks power to proceed"'125 because
its structure and procedures violate both the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions. 126  The Court
found that:
[T]he UCMJ conditions the President's use of military com-
tional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions] ... [the offense] had previously attained
the status of customary international law."). Compare Noman A. Goheer, The Unilateral
Creation of International Law During the 'War on Terror. Murder by an Unprivileged Belliger-
ent is not a War Crime 12 (Am. U. L. Rev. Working Paper No. 1871, 2006), available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8917&context=expresso (murder
by an unprivileged belligerent is a charge unprecedented under the law of war, interna-
tional humanitarian law, and customary international law). Thus, a joint criminal en-
terprise to attack civilians and civilian objects is a cognizable war crime.
The Supreme Court noted that Hardan was not charged with "command responsi-
bility," playing a leadership role, or participating in planning any of the activity.
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761. Yet, that is beside the point. There may be individual
criminal responsibility (such as joint criminal enterprise responsibility) without there
being command responsibility. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7.1, S.C. Res. 827, art. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,
1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute] (covering individual responsibility), art. 7.3 (sepa-
rately covering command responsibility); see also Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No.
IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 79 (Feb. 28, 2005) ("participation in a
joint criminal enterprise is a form of 'commission' under Article 7(1) of the Statute.").
Furthermore "playing a leadership role" and "planning" are not required elements for
a joint criminal enterprise. See generally TRAHAN, supra, at 390-438.
123. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2785.
124. Id. at 2785-86.
125. Id. at 2786.
126. See id. at 2759.
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missions on compliance not only with the American common
law of war, but also with the rest of the UCMJ itself, insofar as
applicable, and with the "rules and precepts of the law of na-
tions"-including, inter alia, the four Geneva Conventions
signed in 1949.127
As to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Court noted
at least three "striking features" about the military commission
rules. First, they permit that the "accused and his civilian coun-
sel may be excluded from, and precluded from ever learning
what evidence was presented during, any part of the proceeding
that either the Appointing Authority or the presiding officer de-
cides to 'close"' (exclusion of defendant from proceedings)128 Second,
the rules "permit the admission of any evidence that, in the opin-
ion of the presiding officer 'would have probative value to a rea-
sonable person."' Thus, hearsay and testimony obtained
through coercion would be "fully admissible" and "neither live
testimony nor witness statements would need to be sworn" (al-
lowing "any" evidence, including hearsay and coerced testimony) .129
Third, "the accused and his civilian counsel may be denied access
to evidence in the form of 'protected information"' so long as
"the presiding officer concludes that the evidence is 'probative'"
and that "its admission without the accused's knowledge would
not 'result in the denial of a full and fair trial"' (denial of access to
protected information used as evidence).13o
As discussed above,1 3 1 the Supreme Court concluded that,
with the "glaring historical exception" of the Yamashita case, l32
"the procedures governing trials by military commission histori-
cally have been the same as those governing courts-martial. 13
127. Id. at 2786 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942); citing In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1946)) (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 2786.
129. Id. at 2786-87.
130. Id. at 2787 (quoting Commission Order No. 1, sections 6(B) and 6(D)). The
Court noted that a presiding officer's determination "that evidence 'would not have
probative value to a reasonable person' may be overridden by a majority of the other
commission members." Id. (quoting Commission Order No. 1, section 6(D) (1)).
131. See supra Part I.C.
132. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2788-89. The Court concluded that "[a]t least partially
in response to subsequent criticism of General Yamashita's trial" the U.C.M.J. expanded
the category of persons subject thereto and the Third Geneva Convention extended
prisoner-of-war protections. Id. at 2789. Thus "[t]he most notorious exception to the
principle of uniformity, then, has been stripped of its precedential value." Id. at 2790.
133. Id. at 2788.
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The Court held that while not all departures from the proce-
dures of the Uniform Code of Military Justice are precluded,
"any departure must be tailored to the exigency that necessitates
it."'1 3 4 Specifically, the Court relied on Article 36 of the UCMJ1 35
to conclude that there are two restrictions on the President's
power to promulgate military commission and courts-martial
rules: first, "no procedural rule" may be "'contrary to or incon-
sistent with"' the UCMJ, and second, "the rules adopted must be
'uniform insofar as practicable.' "1
36
While the Court did not reach the question of whether any
provision of the rules in Commission Order No. 1 was "'contrary
to or inconsistent with' other provisions of the UCMJ," the Court
concluded that the "'practicability' determination the President
has made is insufficient to justify variances from the procedures
governing courts-martial."137 Procedures for courts-martial trials
and military commission trials must be "'uniform insofar as practi-
cable.' "138 While observing that the President has determined it
was "impracticable" to apply the rules for district court trial, the
Court found that he had not determined it was impracticable to
apply the rules for courts-martial.' 39 The Court explained that
the absence of this "impracticability" showing is "particularly dis-
turbing" given the failure to apply "one of the most fundamental
protections afforded not just by the Manual for Courts-Martial
but also by the UCMJ itself: The right to be present. '"14°
Thus, the Court concluded: "Under the circumstances
then, the rules applicable in courts-martial must apply. Since it
is undisputed that Commission Order No. 1 deviates in many
significant respects from those rules, it necessarily violates Arti-
cle 36(b)."' While "exigency lent the commission its legiti-
macy," it "did not further justify the wholesale jettisoning of pro-
cedural protection."'1 42
134. Id. at 2790.
135. See text accompanying supra note 64 (quoting art. 36 of the UCMJ).
136. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790.
137. Id. at 2791.
138. Id. at 2791 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2006) (emphasis added by Court).
139. See id.
140. Id. at 2792 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 839(c) (2006)).
141. Id.
142. Id.
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D. The Commission Violated the Third Geneva Convention
The Supreme Court additionally concluded that "[t] he pro-
cedures adopted to try Hamdan also violate the Geneva Conven-
tions." '4 3 The Government took the position that the conflict
with al-Qaida is not "a conflict to which the full protections af-
forded detainees under the 1949 Geneva Conventions apply" be-
cause the full protections apply only to "'all cases of declared
war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two
or more of the High Contracting Parties.' "144 While the Court
did not decide the merits of that position, it found that "at least
one provision of the Geneva Conventions .. .applies here even
if the relevant conflict is not one between signatories," namely,
Common Article 3.145 That Article provides for certain mini-
mum provisions regarding "'conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Con-
tracting Parties,"' and protects, inter alia, "'persons taking no ac-
tive part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
... .detention."' 146 One of the provisions prohibits "'the passing
of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples.' "147
The Court noted that while the term "regularly constituted
court" is not specifically defined in Common Article 3 or its ac-
companying commentary, commentary to the Fourth Geneva
Convention defines "regularly constituted" tribunals to include
"ordinary military courts" and exclude all special tribunals. 4 8
Additionally, one of the Red Cross's treaties defines "regularly
constituted courts" in Common Article 3 to mean "'established
and organized in accordance with the laws and procedures already in
force in a country.' '"149 As to the requirement that the tribunal
must afford "all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
143. Id. at 2793.
144. Id. at 2795.
145. Id.
146. Id. (quoting Common Article 3).
147. Id. (quoting Common Article 3).
148. Id. at 2796-97.
149. Id. at 2797 (quoting 1 INT'L COMM. OF RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAw 355 (2005)) (emphasis added).
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indispensable by civilized peoples," 150 the Court concluded that
this requires "at least the barest of those trial protections that
have been recognized by customary international law."'' Be-
cause the military commission procedures deviated from "those
governing courts-martial" in ways not justified by "any 'evident
practical need,"' the Court held that they fail to satisfy the requi-
site guarantees of Common Article 3.152 In particular, the Court
stated that it is "indisputably part of the customary international
law, which an accused must, absent disruptive conduct or con-
sent, be present for his trial and must be privy to the evidence
against him." '153
IV. THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006
In response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act (the
"Act"). 1 5 4 The Act, which provides congressional authorization
for military commission trials, does not bring the trials into com-
pliance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Ge-
neva Conventions, but changes UCMJ procedures for the pur-
pose of Guantanamo trials, as well as the United States' imple-
mentation of its Geneva Convention obligations, so that military
commission trials would meet these newly "relaxed" require-
ments.
The potentially problematic aspects of the Act can be classi-
fied into four types. First, there are procedures for military com-
mission trials that are at variance with, or allow for variance
from, procedures established under the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice. While Congress has authority to create such vari-
ances, the changes raise the question of whether the resulting
trials would satisfy the Geneva Convention obligation of trials
pursuant to a "regularly constituted court."'155
Second, there are procedures or substantive definitions that
are at odds with the Geneva Conventions and seek to change
150. Id. (quoting Common Article 3).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2797-98.
153. Id. at 2798. While the former of these concerns is cured under the Military
Commissions Act, the latter, arguably, is not fully cured. See infra Part W.A.
154. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codi-
fied in various sections of U.S.C.).
155. See Common Article 3, supra note 10.
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how the United States implements the Geneva Conventions.
These include an altered definition of who is a lawful enemy
combatant, attempts to immunize U.S. personnel from war
crimes exposure where there is "collateral damage," and at-
tempts at watering down the requirement of trial by a "regularly
constituted court" so that the newly changed procedures would
satisfy it. 15
6
Third, there are aspects of the Act that seek to prevent judi-
cial review (such as the denial of habeas corpus review to Guan-
tanamo detainees), or take issues that should be the subject of
judicial review out of that province, particularly as to matters of
international law.
Fourth, the Military Commissions Act is arguably overbroad.
For example, it purports to create military commission jurisdic-
tion regarding individuals who were never on any battlefield
and/or have no nexus to traditional armed conflict-this is
clearly at odds with how such commissions have functioned in
the past. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to address
every troubling provision of the Act, below are illustrations of
each of these four areas.
A. Provisions that Diverge from the Uniform Code of Military Justice
In several places, the Military Commissions Act permits mili-
tary commission procedures to diverge from procedures under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. For example:
* Under the Military Commissions Act, procedures for mil-
itary commission trials are "based upon the procedures
for trial by general courts-martial . . . ." But the Act spe-
cifically provides that [procedures for courts-martial trials]
are "not binding upon military commissions."' 57
* The Act also explicitly states that certain provisions regard-
ing courts-martial trials do not apply: (a) those relating to
speedy trials (Article 10 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice); (b) those relating to compulsory self-incrimina-
tion (Articles 31(a), (b), and (d) of the UCMJ; and (c)
those relating to pretrial investigation (Article 32 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice). Additionally, the Act
provides that "[o]ther provisions of chapter 4 7 of [the Uniform
156. See infra.
157. Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948b(c) (emphasis added).
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Code of Military Justice] shall apply to trial by military commis-
sion under this chapter only to the extent provided by this chap-
ter. 111
5 8
Two of the military commission rules that the Supreme
Court in Hamdan appeared to have been particularly
concerned with have not been cured in the Act: 15 9
0 Allowing "any" evidence, including hearsay, and coerced
testimony. As discussed above, 6 ' the Court in Hamdan
was critical of the fact that the rules "permit the ad-
mission of any evidence that, in the opinion of the
presiding officer 'would have probative value to a rea-
sonable person."' Thus, hearsay and testimony ob-
tained through coercion would be "fully admissi-
ble."16
These evidentiary issues are not cured in the Mil-
itary Commissions Act. The Act provides that
"[e]vidence shall be admissible if the military judge
determines that the evidence would have probative
value to a reasonable person";162 "[e]vidence shall
not be excluded.., on the grounds that the evidence
was not seized pursuant to a search warrant ... ; 163
and "hearsay evidence not otherwise admissible under the
rules of evidence applicable in trial by general courts-marital
may be admitted. . ."; however, such hearsay "shall not
be admitted ... if the party opposing the admission
of the evidence demonstrates that the evidence is un-
reliable or lacking probative value."" 4 A statement
obtained by torture would be inadmissible, 65 but a
statement where coercion is disputed could be admit-
158. Id. § 948b(d) (emphasis added).
159. A third concern of the Hamdan Court was regarding the ability to exclude the
accused from trials. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2786 (2006). This is
cured in the Military Commissions Act, § 949d(e) of which provides that exclusion of
the accused may only occur where, "after being warned by the military judge, the ac-
cused persists in conduct that justifies exclusion from the courtroom (1) to ensure the
physical safety of individuals; or (2) to prevent disruption of the proceedings by the
accused." 10 U.S.C. § 949d(e).
160. See supra Part III.C.
161. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786-87.
162. Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b) (2) (A).
163. Id. § 949a(b) (2) (B).
164. Id. § 949a(b) (2) (E) (emphasis added).
165. Id. § 948r(b).
2007] MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS
ted in certain circumstances.' 66 Similar provisions
are found in the newly promulgated rules. 167
0 Denial of access to evidence. The Court in Hamdan was
also critical that "the accused and his civilian counsel
may be denied access to evidence in the form of 'pro-
tected information"' so long as "the presiding officer
concludes that the evidence is 'probative"' and that
"its admission without the accused's knowledge
would not 'result in the denial of a full and fair
trial.' ""6 This problem is also not fully cured by the
Military Commissions Act.169
166. A statement obtained before enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 as to which the degree of coercion is disputed may be admitted if "(1) the totality
of the circumstances renders the statement reliable and possessing sufficient probative
value; and (2) the interests of justice would best be served by admission of the state-
ment into evidence." Id. § 948r(c). As to a Statement obtained after enactment of the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, where the degree of coercion is disputed, it may be
admitted if "(1) the totality of the circumstances render the statement reliable and
possessing sufficient probative value; (2) the interests ofjustice would best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence; and (3) the interrogation methods used to
obtain the statement do not amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment prohib-
ited by section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005." Id. § 948r(d).
167. See M.R.EVID. 802 ("Hearsay may be admitted on the same terms as any other
form of evidence except as provided by these rules or by any Act of Congress applicable
in trials by military commission"); M.R.EVID. 402 ("All evidence having probative value
to a reasonable person is admissible"); M.R.EvID. 807 (allowing admission of "hearsay
within hearsay"); M.R.EvID. 803(c) (it is the burden of the party opposing admission of
hearsay evidence to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it is unrelia-
ble under the totality of the circumstances); M.R.EVID. 304(c) (admissibility of certain
statements where coercion is disputed).
168. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2787 (2006) (quoting Commission Or-
der No. 1, §§ 6(B), 6(D)) (emphasis added). The Court noted that a presiding officer's
determination "that evidence 'would not have probative value to a reasonable person'
may be overridden by a majority of the other commission members." Id. (quoting Com-
mission Order No. 1, § 6(D)(1)).
169. Under the prior approach, "protected information" would not be disclosed to
the accused or any civilian defense counsel, but could be admitted into evidence if
presented to military defense counsel. See Rules, 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(D) (5) (b). The Presid-
ing Officer could order "deletion of specified items of Protected Information" before
the documents were made available to the accused, military or civilian defense counsel;
"substitution of a portion or summary of the information for such Protected Informa-
tion"; or "the substitution of a statement of the relevant facts that the Protected Infor-
mation would tend to prove." Id.
The Military Commissions Act now provides that: "[C]lassified information shall
be protected and is privileged from disclosure if disclosure would be detrimental to the
national security." Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 949d(f) (1) (A); see also id.
§ 949j(c). Similar to the prior Rules, the military judge shall authorize "to the extent
practicable:" (i) "the deletion of specified items of classified information from docu-
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0 The Act also allows for the Secretary of Defense to pre-
scribe procedural rules for military commission trials,
and states that they shall "so far as the Secretary considers
practicable or consistent with military or intelligence activities,
apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence in trials by
general courts martial."' Thus, such rules are clearly per-
mitted to diverge from courts-martial procedural
rules.1 7 '
The Hamdan decision did not suggest that military commis-
sion trials must adhere strictly to the procedures under the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice for courts-martial trials, but rather
(interpreting the prior statutory scheme) that the President
could not authorize variances from courts-martial trial proce-
dures without justification.17 2 Rather than having the President
attempt to justify such variances (one option suggested by the
Hamdan decision) or Congress conforming Guantanamo military
commission procedures to courts-martial trial procedures (an-
other alternative), Congress has authorized variances from
courts-martial trial procedures (a new statutory scheme). Such
action is within Congress's power. Congress enacted the Uni-
ments to be introduced;" (ii) "substitution of a portion or summary of the information;"
or (iii) "the substitution of a statement of relevant facts that the classified information
would tend to prove." Id. § 949d(f) (2) (A).
Under the new rules, not only is "classified" information protected and privileged
from disclosure if disclosure would be detrimental to national security (including ex-
culpatory evidence), but the military judge may issue a protective order preventing dis-
closure of "the sources, methods or activities by which the United States acquired the
evidence." R.M.C. 701 (f), 701 (f) (3), 701 (f) (5); M.R1EVID. 505. The new rules also con-
tain a privilege for "Government information" that is not classified, which may be privi-
leged from disclosure if disclosure would be "detrimental to the public interest." See
M.R.EvID. 506.
170. Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a) (emphasis added).
171. Non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights First have been criti-
cal as to additional provisions in the new Manual, for example: (1) offenses such as
conspiracy and "providing material support for terrorism," which they argue violate the
prohibition on ex poste facto laws; (2) the scope of appellate review, which is limited to
matters of law, not fact; (3) the lack of protection regarding evidence obtained through
unlawful search or seizure; (4) that military commission may take place absent critical
witnesses or evidence; (5) that judges and jury have access to witnesses that the defense
and counsel do not; (6) and the fast-tracking of appeals regarding classified evidence,
closure of proceedings, and exclusion of the defense from proceedings. See HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST, ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED RuLEs FOR MILITARY COMMISSION TRIMALS, http://
www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/07125-usls-hrf-rcm-analysis.pdf (last visited Apr. 2,
2007).
172. See supra Part III.C.
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form Code of Military Justice, and possesses power to amend the
statute. It therefore follows that Congress has power to change
trial procedures for one subset of the types of trials covered-
military commission trials at Guantanamo. Yet, this leaves open
the issue (discussed infra) whether such amendments satisfy the
United States' Geneva Convention obligations under Common
Article 3 to hold trials pursuant to a "regularly constituted
court." '7 3 Arguably the preferable course of action would have
been for Congress to adopt trial procedures for Guantanamo
military commissions that adhere to the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice, eliminating any issue as to whether the trials would
violate the requirement of trial pursuant to a "regularly consti-
tuted court."
B. Provisions That Change U.S. Domestic Implementation Of
The Geneva Conventions
A number of provisions contained in the Military Commis-
sions Act appear to be at odds with the language of the Geneva
Conventions. What Congress has done here is change the way
the United States implements the Geneva Conventions, not actual
U.S. treaty obligations. Such provisions include:
0 Redefining prisoners-of-war as "unlawful enemy combatants."
The Military Commissions Act defines an "unlawful en-
emy combatant" as: "[A] person who has engaged in
hostilities or who has purposefully and materially sup-
ported hostilities against the United States or its co-bel-
ligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including
a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaida, or associated
forces)."174 This is a confusing definition. Congress also
provides that some individuals are "lawful enemy com-
batant[s]" (namely, "a member of the regular forces of a
State party," as well as "militia" meeting four criteria, and
173. As discussed infra, Congress has attempted to curtail this possibility by reinter-
preting Common Article 3 to eliminate war crimes exposure for holding trials not pur-
suant to a "regularly constituted court." See infra Part LV.B. While Congress has the
power to change how the U.S. domestically implements the Geneva Conventions in this
manner, as discussed infra, any such changes would not impact on the manner in which
other countries implement the Geneva Conventions-meaning that Congress cannot
eliminate all potential exposure-for example, if another country were to charge war
crimes under universal jurisdiction principles.
174. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(i) (emphasis added).
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other "regular armed forces"),175 yet, at the same time,
appears to mandate that members of the "Taliban, al
Qaeda, or associated forces" are necessarily "unlawful en-
emy combatants.
176
Under the Geneva Conventions, however, any indi-
vidual who is a "[m] ember of the armed forces of a Party
to the conflict" would qualify as a prisoner-of-war (a "law-
ful enemy combatant").177 In fact, members of the
Taliban (the former army of Afghanistan) clearly were
members of the armed forces of a State party to the con-
flict. Any definition that suggests they are not "lawful en-
emy combatants" or "prisoners-of-war" is at odds with the
Geneva Conventions. 17
8
Redefining Common Article 3 to eliminate war crimes exposure
for holding trials not pursuant to a "regularly constituted
court." Section 6(b) (d) (1) of the Military Commissions
Act (Implementation of Treaty Obligations) seeks to
redefine under the War Crimes Act what are Geneva
Convention Common Article 3 violations. Notably, it
leaves off its list of violations "the passing of sentences
175. See id. § 948a(2) (defining "lawful enemy combatant").
176. See id. § 948a(1)(i).
177. The Third Geneva Convention grants prisoner of war status to "[m] embers of
the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer
corps forming part of such armed forces," and irregular fighters meeting certain crite-
ria. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 4A(1).
178. In theory, the determination that all al-Qaida are necessarily "unlawful enemy
combatants" is also problematic. Militia meeting four criteria set forth in the Geneva
Conventions are "lawful enemy combatants" or "prisoners-of-war." See Third Geneva
Convention, supra note 6, art. 4A(2) (requiring a command structure, uniforms with a
"fixed distinctive sign," that arms be carried openly and that operations be conducted
in accordance with the laws and customs of war). Al-Qaida members likely do not meet
the criteria needed for irregular fighters to qualify as prisoners-of-war. Yet, the Geneva
Conventions suggest that if there is doubt as to whether persons qualify as prisoners-of-
war, those persons "shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such
time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal"-an "Article 5 deter-
mination." Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 5. Defining al-Qaida necessarily
as "unlawful enemy combatants" appears to eliminate any ability individuals should
have to contest that designation at a status determination hearing, and any benefit of
the doubt that is due prior to that determination.
The Military Commissions Act is further at odds with the Geneva Conventions by
eliminating from its coverage of members of the armed forces "members of militias or
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces," which is part of the Geneva Con-
vention definition. Compare Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 4A(1), with
Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 9 4 8a(2) (B).
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and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recog-
nized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 1 79  This
amendment would apply retroactively to November 26,
1997.180
Redefining Common Article 3 to create potential immunity re-
garding "collateral damage." Section 6(b) (3)of the Military
Commissions Act additionally seeks to change Common
Article 3 by providing with regard to the Common Arti-
cle 3 crimes of "murder," "mutilation or maiming" and
"intentionally causing serious bodily injury," that where
there is "collateral damage," intent to commit the Com-
mon Article 3 crimes would be lacking.181 This amend-
ment would also apply retroactively to November 26,
1997. 182
These changes are quite problematic.
1. Redefining Prisoners-of-War as
"Unlawful Enemy Combatants"
As to the attempt to redefine who is a "lawful" or "unlawful"
combatant in such a way that the Taliban would be "unlawful"
combatants, Congress has deemed that a group of individuals
(former members of the Taliban) will not be treated as prison-
ers-of-war, when they are entitled to such treatment under the
Geneva Conventions.1 83 This is exceedingly inadvisable at a pol-
icy level, in that it virtually invites foreign countries to respond
accordingly, and in the future deny prisoner-of-war status to U.S.
service-members should they fall behind enemy lines. It is addi-
tionally troubling in that the Geneva Conventions mandate that
prisoners-of-war be tried in the same manner as U.S. armed
forces, 184 namely, according to U.S. courts-martial trial proce-
179. Compare Military Commissions Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (d) (1), with Common Ar-
ticle 3, supra note 10.
180. See Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(b) (2), 120 Stat. 2600,
2635 (2006) ("Retroactive Applicability").
181. See Military Commissions Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (d) (3).
182. See Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635 § 6
(b) (2) (2006) ("Retroactive Applicability").
183. See supra notes 174-178 and accompanying text.
184. The Third Geneva Convention provides that prisoners of war "can be validly
sentenced only ... by the same courts according to the same procedure as [are] . ..
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dures. As detailed above, however, procedures under the Mili-
tary Commissions Act vary considerably from those under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice."' If any Taliban ts are there-
fore tried under the Military Commissions Act procedures, then
the United States arguably would be committing a "grave
breach" of the Geneva Conventions. 18 7 Furthermore, as sug-
gested supra, any immunity created by Congress in this regard
would not impact on other countries' implementation of the Ge-
neva Conventions, potentially creating criminal exposure under
other countries' war crimes laws. 1 88
2. Redefining U.S. Domestic Implementation of Common
Article 3-Eliminating the Requirement of Conducting "Trials
Pursuant to a Regularly Constituted Court"
As to the attempt to redefine Common Article 3 such that
not conducting "trials pursuant to a regularly constituted court"
would no longer be a war crime, and making that provision ret-
roactive, Congress is clearly seeking to eliminate any possible
U.S. exposure for conducting military commission trials that
might be perceived as "irregular"-either, for example, because
they are at variance from pre-existing courts-martial standards' 8 9
members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power." Third Geneva Convention,
supra note 6, art. 102. The Third Geneva Convention also states that prisoners of war
may not be tried by a court "of any kind which does not offer the essential guarantees of
independence and impartiality as [are] generally recognized." Third Geneva Conven-
tion, supra note 6, art. 84.
185. See supra Part IV.A.
186. Based on Combatant Status Review Board letters prepared and released in
2005 by the U.S. Government following Combatant Status Review Tribunal determina-
tions, it is estimated that as of 2005, twenty-two percent of the Guantanamo detainees
were classified as Taliban; twenty-eight percent as al-Qaida and Taliban; and seven per-
cent as al-Qaida or Taliban. See DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX, supra note 100, at 8.
187. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 147 (defining grave
breaches to include "willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and
regular trial . . . ."); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006) (making "grave breaches" war
crimes). The U.S. Government would likely argue, as it has done, that the body of the
Geneva Conventions is inapplicable. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795
(2006). Yet, at least vis-I-vis fighting between the United States and the Taliban (the
armed forces of the former Afghan regime), a quite plausible argument can be made
that the fighting constituted "armed conflict" "between two or more of the High Con-
tracting parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them." See Third
Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 2. If that is the case, then the fully body of all
four Geneva Conventions would apply.
188. See supra note 173.
189. As to the phrase "regularly constituted court," the Supreme Court noted that
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or because they do not satisfy internationally accepted fair trial
standards. 9 ° Again, this is problematic from a policy perspective
because it suggests the acceptability of holding irregular trials-
something the United States ought to be opposing in order to
protect its service-members who might in the future fall behind
enemy lines and be tried. It also suggests a brazen "exceptional-
ism"-that the United States should be bound to different legal
standards than the rest of the world' (which has almost univer-
that term has been defined to mean "ordinary military courts" and not special tribunals,
and courts "'established and organized in accordance with the laws and procedures
already in force in a country.'" Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797 (quoting 1 INT'L COMM. OF RED
CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 355 (2005)) (emphasis added).
It should be noted that courts-martial, as they regularly function, need to be individu-
ally convened by a convening authority, and are not standing or pre-existing tribunals.
See generally Lieut. Col. BradleyJ. Huestis, Anatomy of a Random Court-Martial Panel, ARMY
LAWYER 22 (Oct. 2006).
190. It is beyond the scope of this Article to compare internationally accepted fair
trial standards to the procedures established under the Military Commissions Act. Such
an analysis (now out of date) has been compiled by Human Rights Watch regarding the
Guantanamo tribunals as originally constituted. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DUE PRO-
CESS PROTECTIONS AFFORDED DEFENDANTS: A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PROPOSED U.S.
MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/12/miltrib1204.htm.
Human Rights Watch concluded that "U]udicial standards permitted by a new presi-
dential order on military commissions would be significantly lower than those at war-
crimes courts established by the United Nations." See Human Rights Watch, Press Re-
lease, U.S.: Military Commissions Can't Compare to International Courts: Due Process
Standards Much Lower for Proposed U.S. Trials (2001),
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/12/04/usdom3404.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
Note that as to the requirement that courts afford "all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples,'" the Supreme Court ex-
plained that at minimum that requires "at least the barest of those trial protections that
have been recognized by customary international law." Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796-97
(quoting Common Article 3). The Court also explained that it is "indisputably part of
the customary international law, which an accused must, absent disruptive conduct or
consent, be present for his trial and must be privy to the evidence against him." Id. at 2798
(emphasis added). Trials pursuant to the Military Commissions Act would not allow the
defense to obtain protected information used in evidence.
191. This is part of a trend shown under this Administration, including insistence
by the United States that countries sign bilateral agreements that are designed to en-
sure that no U.S. citizens are tried by the International Criminal Court, along with U.S.
attempts to redefine "torture." See, e.g., Coalition for the International Criminal Court,
Status of US Bilateral Immunity Agreements (2006) http://www.iccnow.org/docu-
ments/CICCFSBIAstatusscurrent.pdf (compiling information on US Bilateral Immu-
nity Agreements); JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER, DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 462-72 (2d ed.,
2006) (discussing changes by United States of interrogation techniques and the defini-
tion of torture as part of the "global war on terrorism").
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sally ratified 9 2 the four 1949 Geneva Conventions containing
Common Article 3, which is regarded as customary international
law in any event).' 93 The U.S. military has consistently seen itself
bound by Common Article 3 in every conflict since the Geneva
Conventions were ratified in 1949,"9 and there is no cogent rea-
son to change this fundamental provision of the laws of war now
or to provide immunity for its violation.
3. Redefining U.S. Domestic Implementation of Common
Article 3-Creating Potential Immunity Regarding
"Collateral Damage"
As to the change to the mens rea for certain war crimes
under Common Article 3-providing that where there is "collat-
eral damage" intent to commit certain war crimes would be lack-
ing, '95 this change appears aimed at insulating American service-
men from war crimes exposure. These changes also are at odds
192. See INT'L COMM. OF RED CROSS, STATE PARTIES TO THE FOLLOWING INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw AND OTHER RELATED TREATIES 6, http://www.icrc.org/
IHL.nsf/(SPF)/partymaintreaties/$File/IHLand-otherrelatedtreaties.pdf (last
visited Feb. 14, 2007) (listing 194 states as parties to the Geneva Conventions).
193. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defense Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 98 (Oct. 2, 1995) ("[S]ome treaty rules have
gradually become part of customary law. This holds true for common Article 3 of the
1949 Geneva Conventions"); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vokovic, Case No. IT-96-
23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 1 68 (June 12, 2002) (holding same);
see also First Lieutenant Melissa J. Epstein and Chief Warrant Officer Three Richard
Butler, The Customary Origins and Elements of Select Conduct of Hostilities Charges Before the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Potential Model for Use by Mili-
tary Commissions, 179 MIL. L. REv. 68, 82 (2004).
The part of conventional international humanitarian law which has beyond
doubt become part of international customary law is the law applicable in
armed conflict as embodied in: the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
for the protection of War Victims; ... the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Regulations annexed thereto
of 18 October 1907; ... the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide of 09 December 1948; . . . and the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal of 08 August 1945.
Id. (quoting Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of United Na-
tions Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), adopted on Feb. 22, 1993 (S/25704)
(May 3, 1993)).
194. See Katherine Newell Bierman, Counterterrorism Counsel-U.S. Program,
Human Rights Watch, To Continue to Receive Testimony on Military Commissions in Light of
the Supreme Court Decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Armed Services, 109th Cong. 06-59 (2006) (Prepared Statement to the Senate Committee
on Armed Services, July 19, 2006).
195. See 18 U.S.C. §2441 (d) (3); see also supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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with the laws of war which permit "collateral damage" only in
certain narrowly circumscribed situations. For example, precau-
tionary measures are required to be taken in launching an at-
tack. Namely, the attacker must (i) "[d]o everything feasible to
verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor
civilian objects"; (ii) "take all feasible precautions in the choice
of means and methods of attack . . ."; and (iii) "[r]efrain from
deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civil-
ian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage antici-
pated."1 96 If such required measures are taken and "collateral
damage" nonetheless results, that is not a violation of the laws of
war.
Yet, Congress's change suggests that it is acceptable to sim-
ply exempt all "collateral damage" (no matter how severe) from
war crimes consequences. Thus, for example, if a bomb that
could not be accurately targeted were dropped by U.S. military
on a legitimate military target that was next to a school, while
school was in session, and killed all the children in school, that
would presumably not be a war crime according to Congress be-
cause there was a legitimate military target and the children's
deaths were mere "collateral damage." Such a result would not
only be at odds with key provisions of the laws of war,'9 7 but be
unconscionable and violate customary international law.19
Again, even if such immunity were effective under U.S. law, it
would not impact other countries' implementation of their war
196. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 57 (2) (a) (i)-
(iii), adoptedJune 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I].
197. See id. at art. 48 ("In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and mili-
tary objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objec-
tives."); art. 51(4) ("Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited."); art. 57(2) (stating precau-
tionary measures are required to be taken). While the United States has not ratified
Geneva Protocol I, these rules are regarded as customary. See, e.g., Jean-Marie Henck-
aerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understand-
ing and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, in 857 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 175, 187-
88 (2005).
198. See Henckaerts, supra note 197, at 187-88 (stating the principle of distinguish-
ing between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objec-
tives; the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks; and the principle of proportionality all
reflect customary international law).
2007] 817
818 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:780
crimes laws, meaning that potential war crimes exposure would
still remain.
4. The Inadvisability of Weakening U.S. Domestic
Implementation of the Geneva Conventions
As a policy matter, it is exceedingly inadvisable to weaken
U.S. domestic implementation of the Geneva Conventions be-
cause it: (a) suggests to other countries that they might do like-
wise and weaken their domestic implementation of the Geneva
Conventions (at least regarding countries where treaty obliga-
tions are not automatically incorporated into their domestic
laws) ;199 (b) places the United States in no position of moral au-
thority to object if other countries change how they domestically
implement the Geneva Conventions; and, in particular, (c) sug-
gests the permissibility of weakening domestic implementation
of Geneva Convention provisions that address the status of com-
batants and procedures for trials of such combatants. In fact, it
is precisely these rules that the United States should be strictly
upholding in order to protect its service-members, should they
require these protections.
Recently, the U.S. military has had forces in nearly one hun-
dred and thirty countries around the world, performing duties
ranging from combat operations to peacekeeping; total force de-
ployment exceeded 350,000.200 Given this exposure, the chance
that U.S. service-members might have need to rely upon Geneva
Convention protections is far from theoretical. The changes ad-
ditionally suggest disrespect for the rule of law, in that Congress
has shown great willingness to alter implementation of key provi-
sions of the laws of war for short-term expedience.
199. For States that are "monist," international law is automatically part of that
state's domestic legal system. For states that are "dualist" (such as the United States),
international law and domestic law are two distinct branches of law. "Under the dualist
view, each state determines for itself whether, when, and how international law is 'incor-
porated' into a domestic law, and the status of international law in the domestic system
is determined by domestic law." DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 191, at 267-68.
200. See GlobalSecurity.org, Where are the Legions? [SPQR] Global Deployments of US
Forces, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/global-deployments.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 3, 2006) (the figure of 350,000 was as of January 2005 and included deploy-
ments in support of combat, peacekeeping and deterrence operations, as well as forces
normally present in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Japan).
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5. Congress's Power to Change U.S. Domestic Implementation
of the Geneva Conventions
As inadvisable as these changes may be as a policy matter,
the issue arises whether Congress had power to authorize them.
As to Congress's ability to amend the War Crimes Act,20' because
Congress passed that legislation, it has sufficient power to amend
it. Where federal legislation conflicts with U.S. treaty obliga-
tions, courts are charged with interpreting the legislation such
that conflict is avoided. 20 2 If such a construction is not possible,
it appears that under the "last-in-time rule" the legislation would
override inconsistent treaty obligations, at least vis-d-vis U.S. do-
mestic law.20 3 While there are critics of the "last-in-time rule ,' 204
the rule appears to represent the majority approach.20 5 While a
policy argument might be made that legislation should not con-
flict with customary international law,20 6 it would likely prove dif-
201. 18 U.S.C. § 2441.
202. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
("[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains, and consequently can never be construed to vio-
late neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law
of nations as understood in this country.").
203. The "last-in-time rule" states "that a federal statute can supercede [sic] a
treaty obligation if the statute was enacted after the ratification of the treaty." Francisco
Forrest Martin, Symposium: Is United States Constitutionalism Good Or Bad For International
Human Rights?: The Constitution and Human Rights: The International Legal Constructionist
Approach to Ensuring the Protection of Human Rights, 1 FLA. INT'L U. L. REv. 71, 72 (2006).
204. See id. at 73 (arguing "that the Last-in-Time Rule is an unconstitutional and
immoral judge-made rule," and that, inter alia, "[t)he text of the Supremacy Clause [in
the U.S. Constitution] indicates that treaties have greater authority than federal statu-
tory law."); see also Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism In United States Courts, 81 COR-
NELL L. REv. 4, 32 (1995) ("When Congress passes a law that is inconsistent with one of
the United States' international obligations, courts can ameliorate-or even eradi-
cate-the harm by refusing to enforce the legislation. But they cannot do so if they
take the position that later congressional legislation supersedes treaty and customary
law."); Jules Lobel, The Limits Of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy And
International Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1071, 1075-76 (1985).
205. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 115 (1987) (last-in-time
rule); see also GARY L. MARIS, INTERNATIONAL LAw 224 (1984) ("In the United States, the
rule established by court decisions since the 1880s for which has precedence between a
law of Congress and a treaty, is that the latest is given effect."); Louis Henkin, Interna-
tional Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1563 n.31 (1984) ("Both the
equality of statutes and treaties and the later-in-time rule have, however, been upheld in
numerous cases and seem firmly established.").
206. See, e.g., McFadden, supra note 204, at 31-34 (arguing that when U.S. courts
engage in "provincialism" and fail to invoke international legal standards this harms:
(a) the United State's reputation as a country that supports "the rule of law in interna-
tional affairs;" (b) "the rule of law" when courts countenance violations of international
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ficult to convince a court to adhere to customary international
law where there is contrary legislation on point.20 7 A stronger
argument might, however, be made if one were to take the posi-
tion that Congress has infringed on a fundamental jus cogens
norm of international law.2 °8
Thus, for example, any change to the laws of war that exon-
erates those who cause unlimited "collateral damage" conflicts
with fundamental tenets of the laws of war requiring observance
of the principles of distinction and proportionality. 20 9 Yet, if the
phrase "collateral damage" were read to prevent war crimes ex-
posure where there was "collateral damage incident to a lawful
attack," that would be a construction that gives effect to both
Congress's language and respects the laws of war.2 1 ° It is diffi-
cult, however, to imagine a construction of the Military Commis-
sions Act provisions which redefine "regularly constituted court,"
redefine prisoners-of-war as "unlawful enemy combatants," and
law by the executive and legislative branches; and (c) "corrodes the very system of inter-
national law").
207. In the Military Commissions Act, Congress has attempted to prevent judicial
reliance on international law in this context by providing: "No foreign or international
source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in the courts of the United States
in interpreting the prohibitions enumerated in subsection (d) of such section 2441"-
the War Crimes Act's definition of Common Article 3 violations. Military Commissions
Act, § 6(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (d); see also McFadden, supra note 204, at 12-13 (discuss-
ing the hesitance of federal courts to apply international law, citing, inter alia: "[Tihe
reluctance of U.S. courts to recognize the existence of international custom"; "the rule
that courts may not invoke customary law, unless, like treaties, it is self-executing"; "the
rule that congressional legislation supersedes pre-existing customary law"; and "the re-
luctance of U.S. courts to recognize the existence of an international rule based on the
'general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.'").
208. As one author argues:
Even Congress and the President jointly should not have the power to violate
fundamental international norms, such as the prohibitions on torture, assassi-
nation of civilians, aggression, or war crimes. These norms effectively operate as
an implicit part of the constitutional limitations on governmental power. Vio-
lations of such fundamental rules should be subject to judicial review as long
as a proper case or controversy exists.
Lobel, supra note 204, at 1075-76 (emphasis added, footnote omitted); see also Christo-
pher W. Haffke, The Torture Victim Protection Act: More Symbol Than Substance, 43 EMORY
L.J. 1467, 1502 (1994) (arguing that "jus cogens, as a non-derogable rule of the highest
status in international law, will arguably supersede a state's conflicting domestic law").
But see Garland A. Kelley, Does Customary International Law Supersede a Federal Statute?, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507 (1999) (collecting certain decisions that hold that jus
cogens does not supersede a federal statute).
209. See supra notes 197-198 and accompanying text.
210. In other words, if all the laws of war were observed-i.e., the attack was "law-
ful"-then resulting collateral damage would not be cause for criminal exposure.
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provide immunity regarding irregular trials, that would be in
harmony with the Geneva Conventions.
If Congress's changes were for any reason invalid (or, view-
ing these changes under other countries' war crimes laws), then
military commission trials that do not adhere to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (which the military commission trials as
currently constituted do not)211 arguably would constitute trials
not by a "regularly constituted court"-a Common Article 3 vio-
lation, i.e., a war crime.2 1 2 While it is unclear whether any such
trials would be so defective as to rise to this level-they well
might not since a good number of procedural protections do
exist-the fact that this issue even arises suggests the inadvisabil-
ity of Congress's modifying the UCMJ's regular trial procedures.
Similarly, as explained above, trials of Taliban members pursu-
ant to the military commission trials as currently constituted ar-
guably would be "grave breaches" or war crimes because they do
not follow UCMJ procedures.213
C. Provisions That Limit Judicial Review, Particularly Regarding
Issues of International Law and the Geneva Conventions
In a variety of provisions, the Military Commissions Act
seeks to limit or eliminate U.S. federal court review of certain
issues. In particular, the Military Commissions Act seeks to en-
sure that detainees may not obtain federal court habeas corpus
review, and that neither detainees nor the judiciary, in certain
instances, may invoke the Geneva Conventions or international
law. For example:
0 Striking habeas corpus review. The Military Commissions
Act eliminates habeas corpus review as to any military
commission trials-including pending cases. 214 The Mil-
211. See supra Part IV.A.
212. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006) (making "grave breaches" and "Common Article
3" violations war crimes; where "death results to the victim," the perpetrator "shall also
be subject to the penalty of death").
213. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
214. Military Commissions Act § 950j(b) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and notwithstanding any other
provision of law (including section 2241 of title 28 or any other habeas corpus
provision), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or con-
sider any claim or cause of action whatsoever, including any action pending
on or filed after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of
2006, relating to the prosecution, trial, orjudgment of a military commission
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itary Commissions Act amends the Detainee Treatment
Act (which the Supreme Court construed in Hamdan to
permit habeas review of pending cases) 215 so that habeas
corpus review is not available regarding pending
cases.
216
* Attempting to limit reliance by the judiciary and detainees on
international law. Section 6(a) (2) of the Military Com-
missions Act states that "[n]o foreign or international
source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in
the courts of the United States in interpreting the
prohibitions enumerated in subsection (d) of [the War
Crimes Act] ."1217
* Additionally, Section 948b(g) provides that "[n]o alien
unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military
commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva
Conventions as a source of rights. '218
* Taking issues of international law away from the judiciary.
Section 948b (f) provides that "A military commission es-
tablished under this chapter is a regularly constituted
court, affording all the necessary 'judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peo-
ples' for purposes of common Article Three of the Ge-
neva Conventions."
2 19
" Similarly, Section 6(a) (2) states that the provisions of
the War Crimes Act "fully satisfy the obligation under Ar-
ticle 129 of the Third Geneva Convention for the United
States to provide effective penal sanctions for grave
under this chapter, including challenges to the lawfulness of procedures of
military commissions under this chapter.
215. See supra Part III.A.
216. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600,
2635-36 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 2241) ("Habeas Corpus Matters").
217. Id. § 6(a)(2), 120 Stat. at 2632 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. 2441(d) by notation).
218. 10 U.S.C § 948b(g). In a note interpreting 28 U.S.C. 2241, the Military Com-
missions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5, 120 Stat. 2600, 2631 ("Treaty Obligations Not
Establishing Grounds for Certain Claims"), also states: "No person may invoke the Ge-
neva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action or
proceeding to which the United States, or a current or former officer, employee, mem-
ber of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a party as a source of
rights in any court of the United States or its States or territories."
219. 10 U.S.C § 948b(f).
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breaches .... "220
Additionally, Section 6(a) (3) (A) provides that "the Pres-
ident has the authority for the United States to interpret
the meaning and application of the Geneva Conven-
tions ... 221
These provisions, taken together, arguably constitute: (a)
an assault upon international law; (b) an attempt to prevent the
judiciary from using international law as a source of law in con-
struing issues related to military commission trials and war
crimes; (c) an attempt to prevent federal court review as to
whether certain war crimes have occurred; and (d) an attempt to
insulate congressional actions from federal court review by elimi-
nating habeas corpus. Some of these provisions raise policy
questions and some raise legal questions, but they add up to leg-
islation that is arguably not in the best interests of the United
States.
1. Eliminating Habeas Corpus Review
Given statements by the U.S. government that detainees
could be held indefinitely at Guantanamo,222 depriving detain-
ees of federal court habeas corpus review is profoundly troub-
ling.223 It is completely unacceptable from the perspective of the
220. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6, 120 Stat. 2600,
2632 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. 2441 by notation).
221. Id. (interpreting 18 U.S.C. 2441 by notation).
222. See Transcript of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Briefing with Report-
ers Regarding Military Commissions (Sept. 18, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2006/September/06_ag_629.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2007) ("[W]e believe it's impor-
tant for a commander in chief to have the tools of a military commission in order to
bring terrorists tojustice. But if for some reason that couldn't-we can't get that from
the Congress, we could continue to hold these enemy combatants for the duration of
the hostilities."); Bill Dedman, US to Hold Detainees at Guantanamo Indefinitely, BOSTON
GLOBE, April 25, 2004, at Al ("Most of the 595 suspected terrorists detained by the
United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, will be held indefinitely, even though there is
not yet enough evidence to charge them with crimes, a senior Pentagon official said in
an interview with the Globe."); Guantanamo Detainees May Remain Indefinitely: Gonzalez,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 3, 2006, http://sg.news.yahoo.com/060803/1/42iww.html
(last visited Apr. 2, 2007) ("We can detain any combatants for the duration of the hostil-
ities." "If we choose to try them, that's great. If we don't choose to try them, we can
continue to hold them.").
223. Federal courts' ability to entertain writs of habeas corpus traces its ancestry to
the Judiciary Act of 1789; common law roots go back far earlier. See Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466, 473-74 (2004).
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human rights of the detainees,224 the United States' proclaimed
respect for the rule of law, and the international image of the
United States to hold individuals indefinitely beyond the reach
of independent legal review.
First, as Justice Black so eloquently argued in his dissent in
Johnson v. Eisentrager.
These prisoners [being held in Germany] were convicted by
our own military tribunals under our own Articles of War,
years after hostilities had ceased. However illegal their
sentences might be, they can expect no relief from German
courts or any other branch of the German Government we
permit to function. Only our own courts can inquire into the
legality of their imprisonment. Perhaps, as some nations be-
lieve, there is merit in leaving the administration of criminal
laws to executive and military agencies completely free from
judicial scrutiny. Our Constitution has emphatically ex-
pressed a contrary policy ....
Conquest by the United States, unlike conquest by many
other nations, does not mean tyranny. For our people
"choose to maintain their greatness by justice rather than vio-
lence." Our constitutional principles are such that their man-
date of equal justice under law should be applied as well
when we occupy lands across the sea as when our flag flew
only over thirteen colonies. Our nation proclaims a belief in
the dignity of human beings as such, no matter what their
nationality or where they happen to live. Habeas corpus, as
an instrument to protect against illegal imprisonment, is writ-
ten into the Constitution. Its use by courts cannot in myjudg-
ment be constitutionally abridged by Executive or by Con-
gress. I would hold that our courts can exercise it whenever
224. While various of the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR") dealing with fair trials are derogable in time of emergency,
the derogations must be "strictly required"-which has been interpreted to mean that
they must be of an "exceptional and temporary nature." See ICCPR, G.A. res. 2000A
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) ("In time of public emergency which threatens
the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States
Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from [certain of] their
obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies
of the situation . . . ."); see also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29:
States of Emergency (Article 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001)
("Measures derogating from the provisions of the Covenant must be of an exceptional
and temporary nature."). The United States, however, has filed no declaration attempt-
ing to justify any such derogations. See Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on
Terror, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 6 (2004).
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any United States official illegally imprisons any person in any
land we govern. Courts should not for any reason abdicate
this, the loftiest power with which the Constitution has en-
dowed them. 225
Justice Black's approach should be the correct one. Even in
times of war, the executive and military should not have com-
pletely unfettered discretion regarding detainees; particularly
where military commissions are held not in the traditional con-
text of the "theatre of war" and/or in conjunction with tradi-
tional armed conflict. The suspension of habeas corpus also
again provides troubling precedent should other countries fol-
low the United States' lead and preclude similar oversight of mil-
itary commissions under their laws.
Second, as to any detainees being held in U.S. military cus-
tody who were apprehended in the United States-such as Ali
Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, arrested in Peoria, Illinois2 2 6 -it is ques-
tionable whether Congress has the power as a matter of law to
eliminate such review. In Johnson v. Eisentrager, the Court found
that "enemy aliens" have no constitutional right to habeas
corpus review, but only when six critical facts were met, includ-
ing that the individual "has never been or resided in the United
States; ... was captured outside of our territory ... ; and is at all
times imprisoned outside the United States. ' 2 2 7 Thus, vis-d-vis
individuals apprehended in the United States there indeed may
exist a constitutional right to habeas corpus review.228
Third, it may be possible to argue that even with regard to
individuals who were not apprehended within the United States
that Johnson v. Eisentrager should not apply, and a constitutional
right to habeas corpus review should be found. It is noteworthy
225. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 797-98 (1950).
226. See U.S. Defends Legal Limits For Detainees, WASH. PosT, Nov. 14, 2006, at A08
(discussing the case of "Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a citizen of Qatar, who was arrested
in 2001 while studying in the United States and is being held at a military prison in
South Carolina as an 'enemy combatant.'" The Government contends that he may be
held indefinitely on suspicion of terrorism and "may not challenge [his detention
through habeas corpus]"); see also al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 360 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 34 (2004).
227. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777.
228. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding, inter alia,
that in the domestic context, the President's inherent constitutional powers do not ex-
tend to the detention as an enemy combatant of an American citizen seized within the
country away from a zone of combat), rev'd, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004)
(jurisdictional grounds).
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that the Supreme Court in Bush v. Rasul, in hearing the habeas
petitions of two Australians and twelve Kuwaitis held at Guanta-
namo, readily distinguished the situation of those Guantanamo
detainees from the detentions at issue in Johnson v. Eisentrager.229
While Bush v. Rasul, which upholds a statutory right to habeas
corpus review based on the law prior to enactment of the Mili-
tary Commissions Act, is no longer determinative, it suggests
clear grounds by which to distinguish Eisentrager.2 3 °
2. Limiting Reliance by the Judiciary and Detainees on
International Law
As to the Military Commissions Act's attempting to limit reli-
ance by the judiciary and detainees on international law, interna-
tional law has historically been part of U.S. law. As stated in the
Supreme Court case, Paquette Habana: "International law is part
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts ofjustice of appropriate jurisdiction .... , 231  The attempt
to eliminate reliance on international law regarding certain war
crimes arguably raises separation of powers concerns, and argua-
229. The Court found Eisentrager not controlling:
Petitioners in these cases differ from the Eisentrager detainees in important
respects: They are not nationals of countries at war with the United States,
and they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against
the United States; they have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much
less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two years
they have been imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises
exclusive jurisdiction and control.
Bush v. Rasul, 542 U.S. 466, 476 (2004). Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion,
distinguished Eisentrager because "Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a
United States territory, and it is one far removed from any hostilities" and, in part, "the
detainees at Guantanamo Bay are being held indefinitely . . . ." Id. at 487-88.
Additional reasons for denying habeas in the Eisentrager case also are inapplicable
regarding Guantanamo detainees. For example, the Supreme Court in Eisentrager in
part reasoned on the basis of logistics: "[t]o give the writ to these prisoners might mean
that our army must transport them across the seas [from Germany] for hearing". Id. at
778-79. In the present situation, however, the logistical difficulties seem far less because
Guantanamo is not distant and various detainees already have U.S. counsel.
230. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on February 20, 2007, upheld the
provisions of the Military Commissions Act that strip Guantanamo detainees of the abil-
ity to have habeas corpus petitions heard in federal court. See Boumediene v. Bush,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3682 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 20, 2007). Certiorari was recently denied
by the U.S. Supreme Court.
231. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (quoted in First Nat'l City
Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423, 452-53 (1964); Skiriotes v. Florida,
313 U.S. 69, 72-73 (1941); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907)).
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bly encroaches on the role of the judiciary.2 3 2 While the United
States is a "dualist" system, in which international legal obliga-
tions cannot be directly invoked as a source of rights,233 plaintiffs
have been free to invoke international law, and judges have been
free to construe international law, for example, where there is a
sufficient statutory basis, such as under the Alien Tort Claims Act
and Torture Victim Protection Act.234 The provision that "the
President has the authority for the United States to interpret the
meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions" 235 simi-
larly appears to give the President an unfettered hand in inter-
preting the Geneva Conventions, which is again not only prob-
lematic precedent in terms of protecting the Geneva Conven-
tions, but arguably undermines the role of the judiciary and
international law as well. 236
D. Over-breadth of the Military Commissions Act: Trying
Individuals Not Apprehended on the Battlefield and/or
During Traditional Armed Conflict
As explained supra, law-of-war military commissions, have
historically only been used in conjunction with traditional armed
conflicts. 2 7 As to the breadth of the commissions authorized
under the Military Commissions Act, the question is whether
Congress may authorize the use of military commissions where:
(a) offenses were not committed within the "theatre of war"; and
(b) offenses were not committed during "the period of war"; or
alternatively, whether one is willing to accept (c) an expansive
definition of the "war on terrorism" such that the "theatre of
232. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I (vesting judicial power in the judiciary); Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (holding that Congress violates the
First Amendment and Article III when it "seek[s] to prohibit the analysis of certain legal
issues and to truncate presentation to the courts," and that the Court would be "vigilant
when Congress imposes rules and conditions which in effect insulate its own laws from
legitimate judicial challenge").
233. See DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 191, at 267-68 (discussing "mon-
ist" and "dualist" approaches to international law).
234. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
235. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(a) (3) (A), 120
Stat. 2600, 2632 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. 2441 by notation).
236. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006) (" [i]f treaties
are to be given effect as federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning
as a matter of federal law 'is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment.") (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
237. See supra Part I.B.
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war" is worldwide and the "period of war" continues indefinitely;
or (d) Congress has simply created a new form of tribunal that is
not a traditional law-of-war military tribunal.
1. The Four Criteria Set Forth in Hamdan Justifying Trial by
Military Commissions Would Not Be Satisfied
As discussed supra,23 8 the Supreme Court in Hamdan sug-
gested that for offenses to be triable before military commis-
sions, four "preconditions" to the exercise of jurisdiction would
need to be satisfied. While these "preconditions" were those the
Court found incorporated into the Uniform Code of Military
Justice,2 39 despite Congress having enacted broader jurisdiction
for military commission trials (rendering the "preconditions"
technically inapplicable), examination of the criteria is still a
useful tool by which to compare past military commissions and
the current ones.
Two of the prior jurisdictional prerequisites were that the
offense must have been committed (1) within "the theatre of
war" and (2) "within the period of war."2 4 It is clear that these
prerequisites would not be satisfied regarding trials pursuant to
the Military Commissions Act. In terms of where the crimes oc-
curred, those triable by military commission include "a person
238. See supra Part III.B.
239. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2777 (2006) ("All parties agree that
Colonel Winthrop's treatise [from which the four preconditions were derived] accu-
rately describes the common law governing military commissions, and that the jurisdic-
tional limitations he identifies were incorporated in Article of War 14 and, later, Article
21 of the UCMJ.").
240. The other criteria are that: (i) a military commission may only try members
of the "enemy's army" and "members of one's own army, who are chargeable with
crimes not cognizable or triable by the criminal courts or under the Articles of war";
and (ii) a law-of-war commission may only try two bffenses: violations of the laws and
usages of war, and breaches of military orders or regulations for which offenders are
not legally triable by court-martial under the Articles of War. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at
2777 n.29 (quoting and citing WINTHROP, supra note 18, at 836-39). Both of these crite-
ria are arguably also violated here. For example, the Military Commissions Act would
not simply permit trials of members of the "enemy's army" but also of those who "pur-
posefully and materially support hostilities against the United States"-which might be
broader than the "enemy's army," for instance, by covering terrorist organizations that
have no traditional "army." See 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1). The Military Commission Act ap-
parently also permits trials for offenses not classically deemed law of war offenses. See,
e.g., Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761 (quoting app. to pet. for cert. 65a (charging Hamdan
with murder by an unprivileged belligerent)); see also Goheer, supra note 122, at 12
(arguing that murder by an unprivileged belligerent is a charge unprecedented under
the law of war, international humanitarian law, and customary international law).
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who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and mate-
rially supported hostilities against the United States, 24 1 but this
does not limit application to those who "engaged" or "sup-
ported" hostilities against the United States on the battlefield in
Afghanistan or in attacking the United States on September 11,
2001, but presumably would include any such engagement or
support worldwide. Indeed, based on estimates, only eight per-
cent of those held at Guantanamo as of 2005 were classified as
"fighters"242 and fifty-five percent of the detainees were classified
as having committed no hostile act against the United States.
243
Similarly, section 948d(a) of the Military Commissions Act gives
military commissions jurisdiction to try offenses even when com-
mitted before September 11, 2001 24 4-and there appears no cut-
off date regarding jurisdiction, suggesting it continues for the
indefinite future. For these reasons alone, the jurisdiction as-
serted under the Military Commissions Act appears overbroad
when compared to historical precedent.
2. The Armed Conflict That Has Occurred and is Occurring
Can Only Justify Part of the Current Military Commission
Jurisdiction-If Traditional Military Commission
Criteria Are Applied
If one accepts that military commission jurisdiction requires
crimes to have been committed within the "theatre of war" and
within the period of war,24 5 then only a subset of the crimes
could be tried by military commissions. Armed conflict has been
defined in international jurisprudence as existing "'whenever
there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organ-
ized armed groups or between such groups within a State.' 
246
241. Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1) (i).
242. See DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX, supra note 100, at 9. Note, however, that as to
individuals classified as "members" of the Taliban and/or al-Qaida (some thirty percent
of detainees), some of those were classified as "members and participated in hostile
acts." See id. at 28, Appendix C.
243. See id. at 11.
244. See 10 U.S.C. §948d(a).
245. As noted supra, these former jurisdictional preconditions are no longer tech-
nically required because Congress has arguably permitted broader jurisdiction under
the Military Commissions Act. See supra Part IV.D.1.
246. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vokovic, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A,
Appeals Chamber Judgment, 56 (June 12, 2002) (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case
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When the United States responded to al-Qaida's September 11
attack, the ensuing fight seems appropriately characterized as in-
ternational "armed conflict," for it involved both armed force
between States (the United States and Afghanistan) and between
governmental authorities (the United States) and an organized
armed group (al-Qaida-assuming al-Qaida qualifies as suffi-
ciently "organized"). Yet, there is now a new government in Af-
ghanistan. While there is continuing violence in Afghanistan,
any continuing engagement with remaining Taliban and/or al-
Qaida certainly no longer qualifies as "armed force between
States" because there is no conflict with the current government.
It might be argued that the residual Taliban forces and al-Qaida
in Afghanistan and its environs (i.e. Pakistan) still constitute "or-
ganized armed groups" with which International Security Assis-
tance Force ("IASF") 247 forces are engaged in "armed conflict."
Thus, arguably, members of al Qaida and Taliban forces appre-
hended in Afghanistan or Pakistan during a period of engage-
ment with U.S./ISAF241 forces might appropriately be the sub-
ject of military commission trials until hostilities there have
ceased or peace has been officially recognized.
The Military Commissions Act, however, would also cover:
(a) individuals apprehended before any "armed conflict" in Af-
ghanistan, or the "armed attack" against the United States on
September 11, 2001; (b) al-Qaida and Taliban members, even
after hostilities cease and/or peace is declared in Afghanistan;
(c) individuals apprehended far from the context of Afghani-
stan, including potentially worldwide; and (d) individuals not as-
sociated with the Taliban or al-Qaida, but any "person who has
engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially
supported hostilities against the United States" 249 _-i.e., includ-
No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
70 (Oct. 2, 1995)).
247. NATO forces are deployed in Afghanistan as part of the International Secur-
ity Assistance Force ("ISAF"). See SC Res. 1707, U.N. Doc.S/RES/1707 (Sept. 12, 2006)
(Security Council extends ISAF in Afghanistan until Oct. 2007).
248. ISAF took over international military operations in Afghanistan with the Oct.
5, 2006 transfer of authority over fourteen remaining eastern provinces from United
States-led coalition forces. See David McKeeby, U.S. Dept. of State, NATO Commanding
International Security Operations in Afghanistan (Oct. 5, 2006), http://usinfo.state.gov/
xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=October&x=20061005175423
idybeekcmO.4493524 (last visited Feb. 6, 2007).
249. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1).
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ing additional and future terrorist organizations and those who
support them. The jurisdiction allowed under the Military Com-
missions Act thus-applying prior criteria-suffers from tempo-
ral over-breadth and lacks the required nexus to armed con-
flict.2 5 0
Trying individuals apprehended for offenses before September 11,
2001. The current Military Commissions Act purports to grant
military commissions jurisdiction over acts prior to September
11, 2001.251 While there have been a variety of terrorist attacks
against the United States, starting with the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing and continuing with the Khobar Towers bomb-
ing and attack on the USS Cole,25 2 they may not qualify as "pro-
tracted" or "armed conflict" with the United States.253 Thus,
good grounds may exist for rejecting any attempt at military
commission jurisdiction over offenses prior to the September 11
attack or, at least, offenses prior to the planning of the Septem-
ber 11 attack-if prior past military commissions are an appro-
priate model by which to judge current Congressional action.
Any argument that protracted armed conflict with al-Qaida com-
menced earlier does not seem supported by the facts. Further-
more, the fact that terrorist trials prior to the September 11,
250. For war crimes responsibility, the International Criminal Tribunal For the for-
mer Yugoslavia ("ICTY") has required that there be a "nexus" between the crime and
the armed conflict. See TRAAN, supra note 122, at 21 (citing ICTY cases holding that for
.grave breaches" there must be a nexus between the conflict and the crimes alleged);
see also id. at 69 (citing ICTY cases holding that for "violations of the laws or customs of
war," this nexus requires that the acts of the accused be "closely related" to the hostili-
ties).
251. See 10 U.S.C. § 948d(a).
252. The Khobar Towers bombing occurred on June 25, 1996. See Al Qaeda Is Now
Suspected in 1996 Bombing of Barracks, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at A13. The attack on
the USS Cole occurred on October 12, 2000. SeeJohn F. Burns, No Special Alert for Cole
Before Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2000, at A1O.
253. Factors for assessing whether armed conflict exists include the "intensity" of
the conflict. See Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Trial Chamber Judgement,
89-90 (Nov. 30, 2005) (citing factors for measuring "intensity"). Terrorist activities
have been excluded from constituting "armed conflict," as have been "isolated and spo-
radic" acts of violence. Id. 89 ("The two determinative elements of an armed conflict,
intensity of the conflict and level of organization of the parties, are used 'solely for the
purpose, as a minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, unorgan-
ized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not subject to international
humanitarian law.'") (emphasis added, original emphasis removed); see also Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2) (d), A/CONF. 183/9, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (July 17, 1998) (entered into forceJuly 1, 2002) (excluding "isolated
and sporadic acts of violence" from constituting armed conflict).
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2001 attack were conducted in federal court,25 4 and not before
military commissions, suggests that the United States did not
then perceive itself to be engaged in armed conflict, but rather
in law enforcement matters.
Trying individuals for offenses after traditional armed conflict
ceases and peace in Afghanistan is proclaimed. The Military Commis-
sions Act has no end date for jurisdiction. Thus, for example, if
there were an amnesty in Afghanistan wherein former Taliban
and al-Qaida members were to relinquish their weapons and
peace were officially proclaimed, in theory, there would still be
military commission jurisdiction over any remaining isolated
Taliban and al-Qaida hostile to the United States. This would be
at odds with the Supreme Court's criteria that offenses triable by
military commission must have been committed within "the pe-
riod of war." '255 It is also arguably at odds with the Supreme
Court's decision in Yamashita, which upheld the power to try en-
emy combatants by military commission even after hostilities had
ceased, at least until peace was officially recognized by treaty or
proclamation.256
Trying individuals apprehended globally. As mentioned above,
the Military Commissions Act clearly allows for jurisdiction over
individuals apprehended far from the context of the armed con-
flict in Afghanistan, including potentially worldwide. Such an
extensive exercise of jurisdiction would be at odds with the re-
quirement recognized vis-d-vis past military commissions, that
the offenses must have been committed within "the theatre of
war. "257
Trying individuals associated with neither the Taliban nor al-
Qaida. The Military Commissions Act also purports to create ju-
risdiction for military commission trials of "a person who has en-
254. Federal court trials include those regarding the 1993 bombing of the World
Trade Center, the trial of Ramsey Yousef, and the trial for the 1998 bombing of the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 925 F. Supp. 1063
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
255. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2777 n.29 (2006) (quoting and
citing WINTHROP, supra note 18, at 836-39).
256. See In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 12 (1946). A subsequent case, Madsen v. Kin-
sella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952), recognized the propriety of using military commissions "even
after peace has been declared, pending complete establishment of civil government in
an occupied territory." Id. at 348 n.12.
257. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2777 n.29 (quoting and citing WINTHROP, supra
note 18, at 836-39).
MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS
gaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially sup-
ported hostilities against the United States. '258 But, to the ex-
tent there was "armed conflict," it was between the United States
and the Taliban and/or al-Qaida. While it might be supportable
to include jurisdiction over persons who intentionally and know-
ingly provided substantial assistance to the Taliban and/or al-
Qaida in their hostilities against the United States, including ju-
risdiction regarding individuals with no link to the Taliban or al-
Qaida259 also removes the link the military commission trials
would have with armed conflict-which is the link required in
the past to justify the existence of military commissions. The
Military Commissions Act thus suffers from serious over-breadth
concerns to the extent that Congress is attempting to create law-
of-war military commissions supported by historical precedent.
3. The "War on Terror" Does Not Provide a Basis for
Establishing the Current Military Commission Trials
Proponents of expansive military commission jurisdiction
might argue that in fact the traditional criteria required for past
military commissions would be satisfied in the current instance,
because, with regard to the "war on terror" or "war on terror-
ism," the "theatre of war" is worldwide and the "period of war"
continues indefinitely. It is inappropriate to adopt such an ex-
pansive definition of the "war on terrorism." For example, as
illustrated above, the requirement of "armed conflict" is not sat-
isfied regarding such a comprehensive "war on terrorism," but
only regarding a subset of the conduct at issue.260 When one
starts applying the laws of war to individuals outside the context
of traditional armed conflict, one begins reaching nonsensical
results. For example, if it were appropriate to treat all terrorism
as a conventional war, then enemy combatants could be shot on
sight.26 While clearly U.S. armed forces are entitled to shoot a
combatant on the field of battle (unless the individual is incapac-
258. Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(i) (2006) (emphasis added).
259. An estimated two percent of the detainees were classified as having no nexus
to al-Qaida or the Taliban. See DENBFAUX & DENBEAUX, supra note 100, at 9.
260. See supra Part IV.D.1.
261. See Roth, supra note 224, at 8-9 (under the rules of war "an enemy combatant
can be shot without warning (unless he or she is incapacitated, in custody, or trying to
surrender)").
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itated, in custody or trying to surrender),262 outside that con-
text-for example, in an airport in Chicago or in suburban Peo-
ria, Illinois-shooting seems completely inappropriate unless
the individual appears armed and dangerous (in which case, au-
thorities would be entitled to act as a matter of law enforce-
ment) 263
Furthermore, if, as the Supreme Court suggested, the ur-
gency for trial upon the battlefield is not present,264 then why
permit abbreviated military commission trial procedures at all?
It is unclear, if terrorists during the 1990s were tried successfully
in federal court, why federal court trials would not be appropri-
ate now, particularly regarding individuals apprehended far
from any battlefield. Put another way, how far from the context
of traditional armed conflict can military commission jurisdic-
tion be stretched? For example, could Congress not create simi-
lar legislation allowing for military commission trials to combat a
declared "war on narcotics"? At a certain point, it is clear such
law enforcement matters (which the war on terror largely en-
tails) do not meet the criteria of armed conflict and do not jus-
tify military commission trials whatsoever.
Past criteria for evaluating the need for military commission
trials are relevant to evaluating the military commissions here, as
Congress is using the laws of war to attempt to justify its actions,
yet attempting to create a tribunal far broader than any law-of-
war type military commission of the past. To the extent that mil-
itary commission trials are appropriate in the current instance,
they should only try individuals apprehended in conjunction
with traditional armed conflict and/or on the battlefield during
a period of armed conflict. All others should be tried in federal
court under federal anti-terrorism laws, or released.
262. Id.
263. See id. at 10 (arguing that if the laws of war are applied to the cases of Jose
Padilla and Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, detained at Chicago's O'Hare International Air-
port and in Peoria, Illinois, respectively, then they would be combatants who could be
shot on sight-a conclusion Roth finds repugnant; Roth argues that ordinary criminal
law should apply in such situations).
264. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2785-86 (2006). The Court noted the lack of
urgency in trying Hamdan that was suggested by the facts in that case. See supra Part
III.B.
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CONCLUSION
Not only does this Administration arguably risk war crimes
exposure if it has erred in the Military Commissions Act of 2006,
it risks harming the perception of the United States as a country
willing to adhere to its international legal obligations. It also
risks jeopardizing the U.S. military in future conflicts, when
other countries might choose to follow the lead of the United
States and change how they implement law of war protections.
Human Rights Watch has appropriately argued to the Senate
Armed Services Committee: "[I] t is only a matter of time before
governments who might otherwise avoid the appearance of ille-
gality will exploit America's efforts to carve out exceptions to the
Geneva Conventions to justify poor treatment of captured Amer-
icans." 265
The United States will be able to firmly stand behind the
rule of law and its Geneva Convention obligations if it: (1)
adopts military commission trial procedures identical to those in
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and limits military commis-
sion trials to trying individuals apprehended in conjunction with
traditional armed conflict and/or on the battlefield during a pe-
riod of armed conflict; (2) tries any other Guantanamo detain-
ees whose charges can be satisfactorily substantiated in federal
court under federal anti-terrorism laws; (3) desists from redefin-
ing the United States' Geneva Convention obligations in any way
(which there would be less need for if trials were held pursuant
to the UCMJ and/or in federal court); (4) desists from attempt-
ing to immunize war crimes resulting from "collateral damage";
(5) reinstates habeas corpus review for Guantanamo detainees;
and (6) ceases attempting to undermine judicial review as to
matters of international law. Then, the United States could hold
its head high on the international stage, as it should, regarding
military commission trials, and start reclaiming its moral author-
ity in its continued response to the attacks of September 11,
2001.
265. Bierman, supra note 194.
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